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Law as Deliberative Discourse: 
The Politics of International Legal Argument ± Social Theory with Historical 
Illustrations 
 
Abstract: This article proposes an account of international law as a subset of 
international political argument, in turn understood as a practice of deliberative 
discourse. I draw on a Habermasian communicative framework to integrate legal and 
political argument, facilitating a more nuanced, and more plausible, understanding of 
how international law and politics interact. Through a detailed examination of two 
historical cases from the first decade of the Northern Ireland conflict, involving the 
United Nations and the European Convention on Human Rights respectively, I 
illustrate three key dimensions of this framework: the relation between legal and 
political argument; the relation between domestic and international argument; and 
the distinction between strategic and communicative uses of legal argument. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
On 2 October 1972, Adrian Thorpe, an official in the UK Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office, circulated a memorandum urging that the United Kingdom consider, as a 
matter of urgency, withdrawing from the European Convention on Human Rights (the 
ECHR), a treaty which it had negotiated two decades earlier1.  
 
$WWKHIRUHIURQWRI7KRUSH¶VPLQGZDVWKHVLWXDWLRQLQ1RUWKHUQ,UHODQG7KHFRQIOLFW
that ZRXOGEHFRPHNQRZQVLPSO\DVµWKH7URXEOHV¶ZDVHQWHULQJLWVIRXUWK\HDUDQG
1972 was to be its bloodiest; 479 people were killed that year, including 148 members 
of the security forces2. It was, in these terms, the biggest domestic threat to any 
Western European state in the post-war era. As the conflict escalated, the government 
in Westminster had been forced into increasingly drastic responses: the deployment of 
British troops to maintain order in August 1969; the introduction of internment 
without trial in August 1971; and the suspension of devolved government in March 
19723. However, the memo¶V IRFXV was not the overall security situation. Rather, it 
was a complaint made by the Irish government under the ECHR in respect of security 
policy in Northern Ireland, alleging discrimination, brutality and torture of detainees. 
As Thorpe wrote, it seemed likely that an interfering neighbour and a legalistic 
convention would together see the UK denounced for officially sanctioning torture. It 
                                                 
1
 0HPRUDQGXP µ6WUDVERXUJ 7KH 1H[W 6WDJH¶ 7KRUSH WR :KLWH (2 October 1972) Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (FCO87/143/335); on the history of the ECHR, A. W. B. SIMPSON, Human 
rights and the end of empire : Britain and the genesis of the European Convention (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001) 
2
 MALCOLM SUTTON, An index of deaths from the conflict in Ireland, 1969-1993 (Ireland: Beyond the 
Pale Publications, 1994). 
3
 See generally PETER NEUMANN, Britain's long war : British strategy in the Northern Ireland conflict, 
1969-98 (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003) 
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was, he suggested, time to re-examine the &RQYHQWLRQ¶V value. It was all very well 
signing up to human rights standards ± although these obviously did nothing to 
improve human rights in the country ± EXWWREHIRUFHGWRGHIHQGRQH¶VDFWLRQVEHIRUH
an international tribunal and to conduct foreign policy through the medium of law was 
surely more than any pious human rights document was worth4? The UK acceded to 
treaties because it intended to comply with them; what purpose was served by 
protracted argument over whether and how far it actually did so? 
 
Such concerns are echoed in contemporary debates DERXW WKH 8.¶V UHODWLRQ WR WKH
ECHR. However my interest in this episode is not as a foreruQQHURIWRGD\¶VGHEDWHV
Rather, in this paper I examine the Irish ECHR complaint, together with a slightly 
earlier initiative at the United Nations, as case studies of the political role of 
international legal argument. These are cases of politicised law, and legalised politics. 
As such, my hope is that they can take us beyond the dualism characterising much 
contemporary scholarship on the politics of intenrational law, illustrating the ways 
that international law and international politics are mutually implicated, and mutually 
constructed, as aspects of a single deliberative discourse. 
 
The next section introduces some key features of the literature on the politics of 
international law, criticising the existing compliance literature and various strands of 
constructivist discourse theory which express, in different ways, an unhelpful 
opposition of law and politics. Instead, I propose an integrated model of legal and 
political argument, building on Habermasian communicative action theory. Various 
scholars have hypothesised that international politics can be in part understood as 
communicative action, but have struggled to demonstrate such action in specific cases. 
I extend their approach, locating legal argument within its wider deliberative context, 
and suggesting how legal and non-OHJDO ORJLFV LQWHUDFW DQGKRZDJHQWV¶GXDO UROHV
participating in both international and domestic discourses, limit, without pre-empting, 
such international communicative action. By understanding international law and 
politics as thus mutually implicated we can better appreciate the ways political agents 
make use of, whilst being simultaneously shaped by, legal institutions and arguments. 
 
Subsequent sections interrogate two historical cases from the Northern Ireland 
conflict to show these logics in action, not only as limits on agents, but as sources of 
action, suggesting that at various points we can identify agents revising their factual 
and normative understandings through communicative interaction, and thereafter 
acting on these revised understandings. Section 3 H[DPLQHV WKH ,ULVK JRYHUQPHQW¶V
unsuccessful attempts in 1969 to initiate a debate on Northern Ireland at the United 
Nations, first in the Security Council and subsequently in the General Assembly. 
While no substantive debate took place in either forum, the implications of action, 
both legal and practical, were fully canvassed by both states in the course of intensive 
                                                 
4
 Similar sentiments were expressed when the UK was the subject of an interstate complaint in respect 
of Cyprus in 1956/57: SIMPSON, supra note 1 at 983. 
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lobbying. The complex normative questions raised, involving claims of a territorial 
dispute, a post-colonial situation, a domestic conflict and a human rights issue, make 
this an excellent case for examining legal argument within ostensibly political 
processes. Section 4 examines ,UHODQG¶V inter-state complaint under the ECHR. This 
was only the fourth inter-state case under the ECHR. Like the UN initiative, it was a 
response to politically sensitive developments in Northern Ireland. However, the 
institutional context is different. It is more explicitly legalised, and third states are less 
relevant. While UN case illustrates law in the domain of politics, the ECHR case is 
more clearly one of politics in the domain of law. The two case studies, while closely 
linked, thus offer opportunties to examine the politics of international legal argument 
in quite different settings.  
 
2. From Law as Rules to Law as Deliberative Discourse 
 
The literature on the politics of international law is vast, and summarising it is beyond 
the scope of this paper.5 Different schools of international relations theory suggest 
different accounts of the political signficance of law, ranging from realist scepticism 
WKURXJK LQVWLWXWLRQDOLVWV¶ FDXWLRXV DFFHSWDQFH WR FRQVWUXFWLYLVWV¶ WKRURXJK HPEUDFH6 
However, much of this existing literature is characterised by an unhelpful dualism. 
Law and politics are understood as distinct, prompting questions about how each 
affects the other.7 
 
This is most obvious in the compliance literature, which examines whether, to what 
extent, and under what conditions, states comply with international law. 8  The 
compliance question, so stated, assumes a causal relation between law and agent. 
Whether this is understood as expressing a logic of consequences or appropriateness, 
it implies that law exists apart from, and prior to, agent and action. 
 
This, however, ignores an important feature of international legal practice, namely the 
way legal norms are invoked. Many ± perhaps most ± norms may directly and 
                                                 
5
 Useful overviews are Beth A Simmons & Richard H. Steinberg, International Law and International 
Relations, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Oona Anne Hathaway & Harold Hongju 
Koh, Foundations of International Law and Politics (New York: Foundations Press, 2005) 
6
 For a critical review: BENEDICT KINGSBURY, ³The Concept of Compliance as a Function of 
Competing Conceptions of International Law´, (1998) 19 Mich J Int¶O/DZ 
7
 For (some of) the problems this dualism raises: KRATOCHWIL, ³How do Norms Matter?´ in Michael 
Byers ed. The Role of Law in International Politics: Essays in International Relations and 
International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 35 at 41-42; ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER 
BURLEY, ³International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda´, (1993) 87 AJIL 205 
at 209-215 
8
 e.g. THOMAS M. FRANCK, The power of legitimacy among nations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1990); ROBERT O. KEOHANE, ³International Relations and International Law: Two Optics´, (1997) 38 
Harv. Int'l. L. J. 487; J. W. LEGRO, ³Which norms matter? Revisiting the ''failure'' of internationalism´, 
(1997) 51 International Organization 31; A. T. GUZMAN, ³A compliance-based theory of international 
law´, (2002) 90 California Law Review 1823 
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uncontroversially determine agents choices. 9  But when international law becomes 
visible, it is because it is invoked, by specific agents, whether to justify their own 
behaviour, or to challenge, criticise of persuade others.10 The intersubjectivity of legal 
norms thus goes beyond their social constitution to include an important social quality 
in their operation.11 We need a model that can account for this. 
 
This objection is not new. However, the alternative models of normative invocation 
and contestation that critics of compliance propose in fact reproduce this duality, 
albeit in different forms. 
 
The contested compliance literature, for example, recognises the role of argument in 
clarifying legal norms, and thereby determing what constitutes compliance or 
breach.12 Law cannot be understood as prior to interaction.13 However, its logic of 
action continues implicitly to distinguish norm (law) and agent (politics). Agents 
stand apart from the norms they are debating. Politics and law interact, but they do so 
within the domain of law. However in the cases I examine, agents and actions, as well 
DV QRUPV DUH REMHFWV RI GLVFXUVLYH FRQWHVWDWLRQ 7KH TXHVWLRQ µZKDW GRHV WKLV UXOH
UHTXLUH"¶LVUHOHYDQWRQO\DVLWLPSDFWVWKHSUDFWLFDOTXHVWLRQµZKDWVKRXOG,ZH\RX
GR"¶ DQG WKH ODWWHU TXHVWLRQ rarely reduces to the former. Contested compliance 
dereifies the norm; but what is required is to dereify the agent. 
 
$QRWKHUSURPLQHQWDSSURDFKLV-RKQVWRQH¶VDFFRXQWRIODZDVGLVFRXUVH14 Johnstone 
characterises international law as a justificatory discourse, substantially open, but 
constrained by a distinctive logic that limits the moves that can be made, and the 
arguments that can count as legitimate.15 $JHQWVXVH ODZWR µH[SODLQGHIHQG MXVWLI\
DQG SHUVXDGH¶ 16  However, as understood by Johnstone, legal discourse does not 
                                                 
9
 It is to these cases that Henkin refers when he suggests that ³almost all nations observe almost all 
principles of international law and DOPRVWDOORIWKHLUREOLJDWLRQVDOPRVWDOORIWKHWLPH´/RXLV+HQNLQ
How Nations Behave: law and foreign policy (New York: Praeger, 1968) at 47 
10
 For this point: CHAYES & CHAYES, The new sovereignty: compliance with interanational regulatroy 
agreements (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard Univesrity Press, 1998); JG COLLIER & AV LOWE, The 
settlement of disputes in international law : institutions and procedures (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1999) at 3-5. Cf. MARTHA FINNEMORE, National interests in international society (New York: 
Cornell University Press, 1996) at 136-143  
11
 For this limitation of constructivist models: JG MARCH & JP OLSEN, ³The Institutional Dynamics of 
International Political Orders´, (1998) 52:4 International Organization 943 at 952. 
12
 E.g. $QWMH :LHQHU ³Contested Compliance: Interventions on the Normative Structure of World 
Politics´, (2004) 10 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 189; Antje Wiener, 
³Contested Meanings of Norms: A Research Framework´ (2007) 5 COMP EUR POLIT 1. Cf. ABRAM 
CHAYES & AH CHAYES, ³On Compliance´, (1993) 47:2 International Organization 175; The new 
sovereignty, supra note 10. For a less optimistic interpretation on contested meanings: ANTHONY 
CARTY, ³Critical International Law: Recent Trends in the Theory of International Law´, (1991) 2:1 
European Journal of International Law 66 
13
 Kratochwil makes an analogous point, arguing that the interpretation of norms and language is an 
inter-subjective rather than individualist practice: KRATOCHWIL, supra note 7 at 52.  
14
 IAN JOHNSTONE, ³Security Council Deliberations: The Power of the Better Argument´, (2003) 14:3 
Eur J Int Law 437; The Power of Deliberation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
15
 JOHNSTONE, ³6HFXULW\&RXQFLO'HOLEHUDWLRQV´supra note 14, at 450 
16
 JOHNSTONE, ³6HFXULW\&RXQFLO'HOLEHUDWLRQV´supra note 14, at 439 
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directly shape outcomes. 17  Indeed, the only mechanism whereby argument might 
affect action is a negative one. Not all justifications will be acceptable to the relevant 
interpretive community, so agents committed to justifying actions are limited to those 
that can be justified. 18 Legal argument is, on this account, essentially second- and 
third-personal; agent and audience are distinct, and it is through its acceptability to the 
audience, rather than its force for the agent, that argument shapes action.19 
 
/HJDO DUJXPHQW WKXV SRVVHVVHV LQ -RKQVWRQH¶V DFFRXQW DQ XQDYRLGDEO\ SXEOLF DQG
performative quality. This is perhaps unsurprising, given his empirical focus on legal 
argument in public venues including the UN Security Council and WTO Dispute 
Settlement Body. However, legal argument is not limited to such contexts. Rather, 
while harder to observe, it forms a substantial component in the confidential bilateral 
interactions, negotiations and lobbying through which international politics proceeds. 
6RPH RI WKLV PLJKW EH XQGHUVWRRG DV QHJRWLDWLQJ µLQ WKH VKDGRZ RI ODZ¶ EXW WKLV
simply begs the question against constructivist models of action. A better approach 
would consider, at least pending empirical resolution, whether such bilateral argument 
is what it appears to be: an attempt to persuade the addressee of the truth and force of 
some proposition, and to act accordingly. 
 
A key issue is therefore how we should understand the link from legal argument to 
political action, in both first- and third-person contexts. In the case studies that follow, 
I investigate the hypothesis that we can understand international legal argument as, at 
least in part, an example of what Habermas labels communicative action, and that we 
can thereby shift our focus, from agents exchanging arguments, to agents being 
shaped by and acting upon arguments.20 We thus move beyond the study of speech, to 
the relation between speech and action. 
                                                 
17
 For this point, and the consequent challenges in demonstrating that link in practice: Anna 
+RO]VFKHLWHU³Between Communicative Interaction and Structures of Signification: Discourse Theory 
DQG$QDO\VLV LQ ,QWHUQDWLRQDO5HODWLRQV´ (2014) 15:2 INTERNATIONAL STUDIES PERSPECTIVES, 142 at 
157-158. A similar objection applies to e.g. Nicholas J. Wheeler, "The Kosovo Bombing Campaign" in 
Christian Reus-Smit ed., The Politics of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004). Cf. 'LQR .ULVWLRVLV ³:KHQ VWDWHV XVH DUPHG IRUFH´ LQ 5HXV 6PLW HG The Politics of 
International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). Chayes and Chayes do highlight 
the persuasive effect of legal argument in advocating for or against actions by others; CHAYES & 
CHAYES, The new sovereignty, supra note 10 at 119 
18
 Johnstone does advert to the possibility of listeners responding communicatively, but this is not 
puUVXHGLQVXEVHTXHQWGLVFXVVLRQV-RKQVWRQH³6HFXULW\&RXQFLO'HOLEHUDWLRQV´supra note 14 at 455 
19
 Similar mechanisms are emphasized in: MARC LYNCH, ³Lie to me: sanctions on Iraq, moral 
argument and the international poOLWLFV RI K\SRFULV\´, in Richard M. Price ed., Moral Limit and 
Possibility in World Politics (Cambrdige: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Jon ELSTER, ³Strategic 
Uses of Argument´, in KJ Arrow et al, eds, Barriers to Conflict Resolution, (New York: WW Norton, 
1995) 237 at 250. Some scholars, of course, might deny that there is a distinction between motivation 
and justification. E.g. KRATOCHWIL, supra note 7, at 67 
20
 The approach outlined here builds on existing efforts to translate Habermas to international relations, 
including inter alia: THOMAS RISSE, ³"Let's Argue!": Communicative Action in World Politics´, (2000) 
54:1 International Organization 1; HARALD MULLER, ³Arguing, Bargaining and all that: 
Communicative Action, Rationalist Theory and the Logic of Appropriateness in International 
Relations´, 10:3 European Journal of International Relations 395. On argument in international 
relations more generally, Neta Crawford, Argument and Change in World Politics: ethics, 
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This requires introducing four concepts: strategic and communicative action; and 
arguing and bargaing. 
 
Communicative action is defined as a mode of action that seeks consensus through a 
readiness to submit to the better argument21. When acting communicatively, Risse 
suggests, µDFWRUV VHHN WR FKDOOHQJH WKH YDOLGLW\ FODLPV LQKHUHQW LQ DQ\ FDusal or 
normative statement and to seek a communicative consensus about their 
understanding of a situation as well as justifications for the principles and norms 
JXLGLQJDFWLRQ¶22. Communication is characterised by openness to changing positions 
based on rational argument 23 . Whether, and to what extent, agents act 
communicatively will presumably vary across contexts24. However, where they do, 
their behaviour is directly shaped by the process of argument, as they come to act 
towards the world in terms of changed factual and normative understandings. Action, 
including norm-driven action, is thus understood as rational, grounded in reasons and 
subject to revision based on rational argument.25 Identifying communicative action 
requires tracking changes in actorV¶ YLHZV DQGRU SUHIHUHQFHV DQG WKH associated 
processes of persuasion and deliberation26.  
 
                                                                                                                                           
decolonization and humanitarian intervention (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) at 11-
81. The influence of Habermas in Reus-6PLW¶VZRUNLVSURPLQHQWVHHLQSDUWLFXODUCHRISTIAN REUS-
SMIT, ³Human rights and the social construction of sovereignty´ (2001) 27 Review of International 
Studies 519; CHRISTIAN REUS-SMIT, ³The Constitutional Structure of International Society and the 
1DWXUH RI )XQGDPHQWDO ,QVWLWXWLRQV´, (1997) 51 International Organization 555. Analogues are also 
present in Kratochwil, in particular his GLVWLQFWLRQ EHWZHHQ µEDUJDLQLQJ¶ DQG WKH QRUP-structured 
µGLVFRXUVH RI JULHYDQFHV¶ KRATOCHWIL, Rules, norms and decisions: on the conditions of practical 
and legal reasoning in international relations and domestic affairs (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Presss, 1989) at 181 and Chs. 1, 5 and 7 generally. On the distinction between communicative action 
approaches and other discourse theories: Holzscheiter, supra note 17. 
21
 For a more complete discussion of communicative action in international relations, MATHIAS 
ALBERT, et al., On order and conflict: International Relations and the 'communicative turn', 34 Review 
of International Studies 43 (2008). 
22
 RISSE, supra note 20, at 7. 
23
 MULLER, supra note 20, at 405; LARS G. LOSE, ³Communicative Action and the World of 
'LSORPDF\´, in Karim M Fierke and Knud Erik Jorgensen, eds, Constructing International Relations : 
the next generation (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2001) at 184 
24
 Muller emphasises that the modes of action are ideal types, which in practice are likely to occur 
simultaneously: HARALD MULLER, ³,QWHUQDWLRQDO 5HODWLRQV DV &RPPXQLFDWLYH $FWLRQ´, in Karim M 
Fierke and Knud Erik Jorgensen, eds, Constructing International Relations: the next generation 
(Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2001) at 162 
25
 This contrasts with models of norm acquisition that distinguish reasoning, understood instrumentally, 
from socially acquired and non-rational normative motivation (e.g. taboo). See e.g. Nina Tannenwald, 
The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the non-use of nuclear weapons since 1945 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007) 
26
 On the difficulties of operationalizing communicative action, NICOLE DEITELHOFF & HARALD 
MULLER, ³7KHRUHWLFDO SDUDGLVH HPSLULFDOO\ ORVW" $UJXLQJ ZLWK +DEHUPDV´, (2005) 31 Review of 
International Studies 167 at 170-171. &UDZIRUG VXJJHVWV WKDW µ>Z@H FDQ LQIHU WKDW  DUJXPHQWV ZHUH
causally important if actors change their beliefs and behaviour after they have heard arguments and if 
RWKHUH[SODQDWLRQVIDLOWRDFFRXQWIRUWKHFKDQJH¶CRAWFORD,  supra note 20, at 36. 
Page 7 of 44 
 
Communication contrasts ZLWK VWUDWHJLF DFWLRQ ZKLFK µDLPV DW PDNLQJ RQH¶V RZQ
SUHIHUHQFHVSUHYDLOXVLQJDOOLQVWUXPHQWVDYDLODEOHIRUDFKLHYLQJWKLVREMHFWLYH¶27. We 
may still observe behaviours that outwardly seem like communication and argument; 
but actors use these to obtain information, and to induce others to change their 
positions, without being themselves open to movement, except instrumentally. 
Hypothesizing communicative action does not mean denying the concurrent, and 
often predominant, role of strategic action in many cases.  
 
Given these distinct logics of action, arguing and bargaining are in turn defined as 
specific types of speech act28. Arguing, MulleU VXJJHVWV µproposes the truth of a 
factual, or the normative validity of a moral, proposition with a view to convince the 
target (listener, receiver) of the claim made by the speaker. Truth and normative 
validity are proposed by resting the proposition on a second one that is meant to prove 
WKHYDOLGLW\RIWKHFODLP¶%\FRQWUDVWµ>E@DUJDLQLQJFRQWDLQVSURPLVHVDQGWKUHDWVDQG
LQWHQGV WR FKDQJH EHKDYLRXU¶29 $FWRUV VHHN WR DFKLHYH WKHLU JRDOV E\ µH[FKDQJLQJ
demands backed by credible promises, threats, or H[LW RSSRUWXQLWLHV¶ DQG
communication is limited to the making of such demands30. So defined, bargaining is 
the quintessential strategic negotiating behaviour. Neither arguing nor bargaining is 
necessarily limited to explicit statements; institutional actions (and indeed non-
institutional actions) may also function as discrete arguments, or as part of a 
bargaining process. 
 
If politics is understood as a locus of strategic and communicative action, then we 
might in turn understand legal argument as a distinctive sub-set of such action. Legal 
claims may constitute argument, in so far as they open a legal-normative discourse 
around the rules applicable in a given situation. However, they may also be used in a 
bargaining mode, in which the threat of legal action, or the possibility of conceding a 
legal point, constitutes a stick or carrot. In neither case should we expect to see them 
used to the exclusion of other, poliitcal, arguments. Where argument, legal or non-
legal, is observed, this may be communicative or strategic. More likely, we will see a 
mix; actors might initially argue both to convince others, and to justify positions to 
themselves, domestic audiences, and third parties; but may subsequently, through 
processes of simple learning, rhetorical entrapment or communicative action, find 
                                                 
27
 MULLER, supra note 20, at 397. Risse further distinguishes communicative action from the logic of 
appropriateness, arguing that the three logics represent overlapping ideal types: RISSE, supra note 20, at 
22-23. 
28
 On the concept of a speech act: MULLER, supra note 20, at 397. Cf. KRATOCHWIL, supra note 20, at 
6-9. 
29
 MULLER, supra note 20, at 397. .UDWRFKZLO¶VGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQEDUJDLQLQJDQG WKH µGLVFRXUVHRI
grievances' is similar, but not directly analagous: KRATOCHWIL, supra note 20, at 181. 
30
 RISSE, supra 8. 
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their preferences, whether over immediate actions or long-term outcomes, change 
EDVHGRWKHUV¶arguments31. 
 
2QH TXHVWLRQ UDLVHG E\ WKLV WXUQ WR DUJXPHQW LV KRZ ZH VKRXOG GLVWLQJXLVK µOHJDO¶
IURP µQRQ-OHJDO¶ RU µSROLWLFDO¶ DUgument. For compliance theorists, law can be 
conceived as a body of rules distinct from political practice. Having rejected 
FRPSOLDQFH¶VGXDOLVPZHPXVWLQVWHDGGLVWLQJXLVKWKHµOHJDO¶DVDSDUWLFXODUVW\OHRI
reasoning, with and about rules.32 Kratochwil, for example, identifies as a critical 
feature of legal argument µWKHSULQFLSOHGFKDUDFWHURIDSSOLFDWLRQ¶µ³OHJDOLW\´UHTXLUHV
the even-KDQGHG DSSOLFDWLRQ RI UXOHV LQ ³OLNH´ VLWXDWLRQV¶33. Arguments in terms of 
generally applicable principles, rules and categories, rather than of specific instances 
and discretionary decisions, are distinctive of legal discourse. The emphases which 
legal reasoning places on precedent and analogy are specific manifestations of this 
ideal of principled application34. Reus-Smit expresses a similar, albeit broader, idea 
ZKHQKH FKDUDFWHULVHV LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZDV µD GLVWLQFWLYH W\SHRI DUJXPHQW LQZKLFK
principles and actions must be justified in terms of established, socially sanctioned, 
QRUPDWLYHSUHFHSWV¶35. Law thus involves, not only reasoning in terms of principle, but 
also appeals to the authority of particular socially mandated sources, whether this be 
particular documents (treaties, resolutions, legislation), practices (custom, precedent) 
or agents (judges, arbitrators); we need not embrace legal positivism to recognise such 
appeals to authority as distinctive of legal reasoning.36 7KHUHLVQRGHILQLWLRQRIµODZ¶
RU µOHJDO¶ KHUH +RZHYHU WKHVH IHDWXUHV VXIILFH IRU P\ SXUSRVHV DOORZLQJ PH WR
provisionally distinguish legal argument from the broader category of political 
argument in my case studies. 
 
Legal argument, then, is conceived as an aspect of deliberative discourse, linked to 
outcomes through logics of communicative and strategic action. Implicit in this 
approach is the assumption agents can evaluate alternative arguments and, in cases of 
conflict, determine which should prevail. In conseqeunce, argument cannot proceed in 
a social or normative vacuum; even as it challenges factual and normative 
assumptions, it can do so only by reference to further such assumptions. Habermas 
ODEHOVDVWKHµOLIH-ZRUOG¶Whe store of shared meanings and interpretations on the basis 
                                                 
31
 On rhetorical entrapment, LYNCH, supra note 19; RISSE, supra note 20, at 8-9. Cf. JOHNSTONE, 
³6HFXULW\&RXQFLO'HOLEHUDWLRQV´ supra note 14, at 454. On argument as self-validation, RS BARKER, 
Legitimating identities: the self-presentation of rulers and subjects (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001) 
32
 KRATOCHWIL, supra note 20, at 211. Cf. TOOPE, supra102 
33
 KRATOCHWIL, supra note 20, at 208 
34
 Ibid. at 221, 223-228. Cf. CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 10, at 131-133 
35
 REUS-SMIT, The politics of international law, supra note 17, at 41 
36
 They remain, for example, central to the leading contemporary anti-positivist theory of law: Ronald 
Dworkin, Laws Empire (Oxford: Hart, 1986) 
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of which argument proceeds.37 The non-existence of such a shared life-world is a 
common objection to attempts to apply communicative action theory in international 
relations. However it is doubtful how far that objection can be sustained 38 . The 
existence of a wealth of widely accepted treaties (supplemented by resolutions of 
international organisations), addressing issues from human rights and the non-use of 
force to international trade and postal cooperation, suggests there is an extensive store 
of at least rhetorically shared meanings and values to which agents can appeal. Risse 
and Muller point variously to institutions and the diplomatic community as foci of 
overlapping life-worlds39; while Risse suggests that in thinly institutionalised contexts 
such a life-world can be strengthened through pre-QHJRWLDWLRQ QDUUDWLRQ RI µVKDUHG
experiences, common historical memorLHV DQG WKH OLNH¶40.  Further, it may not be 
necessary that interests and values be shared,  as opposed to merely mutually 
comprehensible, to ground communicative action. Actors with very different 
understandings of the world might still engage in, and act upon, communicative 
argument, provided they can recognise the values of the other, and offer accounts that 
relate to those values.41 
 
In the context of legal argument, the specific legal norms invoked provide a ready 
store of shared meanings. 5HMHFWLQJ FRPSOLDQFH¶V VWDWLF FRQFHSWLRQ RI ODZ DV UXOHV
does no require jettisoning the vast corpus of existing legal texts and practices; rather, 
we understand these as the raw materials of deliberative discourse. As Reus-Smit 
argues, where actors perceive themselves as acting in a legal context they give 
priority to legal arguments, and legal modes of reasoning42. These may not prevail to 
the exclusion of others, but they have a prima-facie legitimacy43. Absent any deeper 
commonalities, we can expect argument to proceed at this level. However, where 
other values are shared, we may expect to see the existing legal rules, or the manner 
in which they are interpreted or applied in a given context, challenged by reference to 
                                                 
37
 RISSE, supra note 20, at 10, 14. Similar ideas appear in: THOMAS FRANCK Fairness in International 
Law and Institutions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) at 12; REUS-SMIT, ³&RQVWLWXWLRQDO
6WUXFWXUH´, supra note 20, at 564; Crawford, supra note 20, at 68-78. 
38
 LOSE,  supra note 23, at 183 
39
 Different international organizations, institutionalizing different shared norms and values, may 
provide quite different deliberative contexts, in which different arguments will succeed or fail. 
40
 RISSE, supra note 20, at 14-16; MULLER, supra note 20, at 419-421. 
41
 LOSE,  supra note 23, at 187. The extent to which underlying interests and values are shared will be 
reflected in the types of principles on which states can agree. This links to the pluralist/solidarist debate 
in English School scholarship: ANDREW HURRELL, On global order : power, values, and the 
constitution of international society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 25-94. Reus-Smit 
LGHQWLILHV µD GLDORJXH EHWZHHQ SOXUDOLVW DQG VROLGDULVW SULQFLSOHV¶ LQ WKH GLVFRXUVH RI ODZ DV D
communicative process: REUS-SMIT, supra note 17, at 277. Cf. JOHNSTONE, supra 456; REUS-SMIT, 
The moral purpose of the state, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) at 36-39. 
42
 REUS-SMIT, The politics of international law, supra note 17, at 37. 
43
 FRIEDRICH V. KRATOCHWIL, ³&RQVWUXFWLYLVPDVDQ$SSURDFKWR,QWHUGLVFLSOLQDU\6WXG\´ in Karim 
M Fierke and Knud Erik Jorgensen, eds, Constructing International Relations: the next generation 
(Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2001) 
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such values. 44  Argument involves not only the appeal to norms, but also the 
possibility of challenging normative arguments and frames by reference to other facts 
or values. Legal arguments may be challenged on extra-legal grounds, and normative 
conflict can be expected around the framing of situations, which will determine 
whether and how legal arguments become relevant45. Challenges to the salience of 
legal norms may be particularly prominent at moments of crisis, when the default 
quality of legal solutions seems less compelling. Law and politics are thus integrated 
as aspects of a single discursive practice; and where they are understood as distinct, 
we are drawn to consider the discursive constitution, maintenance and contetstion of 
that distinction.46 The scope for legal and political considerations to interact through 
argument means that neither can be considered a discrete phenomenon. Rather, we 
must be sensitive to the interactions between legal and political arguments, and across 
ostensibly legal and political domains. 
 
A related challenge is the multiple contexts in which actors participate simultaneously. 
Whereas diplomats may share an international diplomatic life-world, they are also 
deeply embedded in their domestic political cultures. Actions and arguments in the 
international sphere must also resonate within the domestic sphere; foreign policy 
constitutes D µWZR-OHYHO GLVFRXUVH¶ DQG WKH UXOHV DQG UHIHUHQFH V\VWHPV LQ WKH
domestic and international discourses are likely to diverge, limiting the scope for 
communicative action at the international level47. However, rather than assume that 
this pre-empts any potential for international communicative action, I approach these 
cases open to the possibility that domestic and international deliberative discourses 
exist in parallel. Their terms will differ. Unquestioned premises in one context may be 
controversial, or indeed unthinkable, in another. The need to manage this dissonance 
will limit the arguments that can be made, or accepted, in each. However, there may 
still be scope for communicative action to proceed. And indeed law may provide a 
shared vocabulary in which the particularistic values of domestic discourse can be 
translated into internationally shared, and hence mutually comprehensible, terms. 48 
As with the relation between legal and non-legal, we must be sensitive to the 
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 Chayes and Chayes highlight that legal norms are not the only means of justification available: 
CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 10, at 120.  
45
 ,Q0XOOHU¶V WHUPV IUDPLQJ µGHPDUFDWHV WKHERUGHUOLQHEHWZHHQEDUJDLQLQJ DQG DUJXLQJ¶ MULLER, 
supra note 20, at 415. Cf. CRAWFORD, supra note 20, at 19-22. 
46
 Reus-Smit DUWLFXODWHV WKLV LGHD LQ WHUPV RI ODZ¶V ³GLVFRXUVH RI LQVWLWXWLRQDO DXWRQRP\´ DOEHLW KH
places less emphasis that I do on the way that autonomy is itself subject to challenge: REUS-SMIT, 
supra note 17, at 37 
47
 LOSE,  supra note 23, at 165. Cf. ROBERT D. PUTNAM, ³Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic 
of Two-Level Games´, (1988) 42:3 International Organization 427. Muller argues that such two-level 
discourses may also result in a shift in the domestic discourse: MULLER, supra note 20, at 423. Cf. 
MARKUS KORNPROBST, ³Episteme, nation-builders and national identity: the re-construction of 
,ULVKQHVV´, (2005) 11:3 Nations and Nationalism 403; MARKUS KORNPROBST, ³Dejustification and 
'LVSXWH6HWWOHPHQW,UUHGHQWLVPLQ(XURSHDQ3ROLWLFV´, (2007) 13:4 European Journal of International 
Relations 459. 
48
 Johnstone makes a similar point, labelling law as the language of international society: JOHNSTONE, 
³6HFXULW\&RXQFLO'HOLEHUDWLRQV´supra note 14, at 461. 
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relationship between deliberative discourses at domestic and international levels, 
rather than assuming in advance that one trumps the other. 
 
This model of law as communicative action goes beyond existing discursive models 
to hypothesise, not only the structure of argument within a given legal discourse, but 
also the relation between legal and non-legal argument, between domestic and 
international discourses, and between legal argument and political action. On each 
dimenstion, it emphasises the first personal quality of legal argument, whether for 
speaker or listener. Legal argument, it suggests, is not just about how we explain 
ourselves, or evaluate others. Rather, it directly implicates our own choices and 
actions. 
 
These claims cannot be readily tested by examining public statements. Such 
statements inevitably address audiences beyond the immediate interlocutors, making 
it impossible to disaggregate the effects of argument on participants from their 
concerns to legitimise actions in the eyes of third parties, whether domestic publics or 
third states. 49  We might try to get behind them through research interviews and 
memoirs, but observation effects make it difficult to draw robust motivational 
conclusions.50  To address this, I rely instead on government archives, examining 
contemporaneous diplomatic communications and confidential analyses to trace 
motivations, strategies and interactions, with a view to identifying how far the 
hypothesised mechanisms are present in these cases. This involved an exhaustive 
review of files from: in Ireland, the Irish Department of External Affairs / Foreign 
Affairs51  and Department of the Taoiseach (Prime Minister); and in the UK, the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the PrimH 0LQLVWHU¶V 2IILFH52 The archival 
                                                 
49
 While focusing on such third-person concerns suggests audiences are themselves open to 
communication, it assumes agents directly involved express only a logic of consequences. On the 
ontological premises of such argument: RISSE, supra 8-9; JON ELSTER, Strategic Uses of Argument, in 
Barriers to Conflict Resolution 248 (Kenneth J. Arrow, et al. eds., 1995); MULLER, Arguing, 
Bargaining and all that, 404-407. 
50
 DEITELHOFF & MULLER. supra note 26. Cf. RISSE, supra note 20, at 26. CECILIA ALBIN, Justice and 
fairness in international negotiation 20  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) 
51
 The name of this department was changed in 1971, during the period covered by these case studies. 
52
 Both states release almost all government files to public archives after a fixed period. The vast 
majority of relevant documentation for these case studies appears to be in the archives. A full list of 
files reviewed appears as an annex to the online version of this article, available at http://www.jilir.org. 
Where archival materials are cited below, they include a file reference HJ ³35(0´
specifying the file in the relevant archive in which the original document is held. References including 
³PREM´ or ³FCO´ refer to documents in the UK National Archives, Kew, Richmond, Surrey, TW9 
4DU, United Kingdom. References including ³NA´ refer to documents in the National Archives of 
Ireland, Bishop Street, Dublin 8, Ireland. 
I am not aware of any published study examining these materials in detail. Two studies of Irish policy 
towards Northern Ireland make reference to the materials in respect of the UN initiatives: MICHAEL 
KENNEDY, Division and consensus: the politics of cross-border relations in Ireland, 1925-1969 
(Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, 2000); RONAN FANNING, ³Playing it cool: The response of 
the British and Irish governments to the crisis in Northern Ireland, 1968-´, (2002) 12 Irish Studies in 
International Affairs 57. However neither focuses on the UN processes, or on the role of law or 
argument. One study examines the UN initiatives from a US perspective, based on US Archives: 
DANIEL C. WILLIAMSON, ³Taking the Troubles across the Atlantic: Ireland's UN Initiatives and Irish-
US Diplomatic Relations in the early years of the Conflict in Northern Ireland, 1969-´, (2007) 18 
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method has limits, both in the cases it can investigate and the empirical claims it can 
VXSSRUWEXWPRUHWKDQDQ\RWKHUWHFKQLTXHLWDOORZVXVWRORRNµLQVLGHWKHKHDGV¶RI
political agents, and thereby opens the possibility of distinguishing between modes of 
action, and identifying the relations between legal argument and action. It is with this 
goal in mind that I now turn to my two case studies. 
 
3. Ireland at the UN Security Council and General Assembly 
 
In August 1969, against the backdrop of sectarian rioting in Belfast and Londonderry 
and the deployment of British Army troops to maintain order, the Irish government 
took the unprecedented step of seeking to internationalise the Northern Ireland 
question through the political fora of the United Nations. Responding to the 
deteriorating security situation over previous months, this represented an attempt to 
assert the legitimacy of Irish interests in Northern Ireland, and to challenge UK 
assertions of exclusive competence. This section examines this initiative, and in 
particular the role of legal argument within and around the Security Council and 
General Assembly, in light of the framework outlined above. 
 
The initiatives described in this Part took place within and around the two main 
political organs of the UN, the Security Council (SC) and General Assembly (GA)53. 
In both GA and SC, the majority of argument takes place not in public debate, but 
rather in informal meetings and diplomatic lobbying54. Public statements in these fora 
are important, and merit examination in their own right, but the inter-state politics 
through which consensus is built and decisions reached can be understood only 
through examining that informal lobbying55. 
 
In both fora substantive debate was forestalled by the UK without the issue coming to 
a vote. The arguments and lobbying discussed below are therefore primarily 
addressed to the preliminary question of whether the relevant agenda item should be 
DGRSWHGUHIHUUHGWRDVµLQVFULSWLRQ¶+RZHYHU the fact that the decision is procedural 
                                                                                                                                           
Irish Studies in International Affairs 175. The Security Council initiative is also discussed briefly, 
based on public documents, in: ANDREW BOYD, Fifteen men on a powder keg : a history of the UN 
Security Council   (Toronto: Methuen, 1971). While the ECHR case features prominently in legal texts, 
it has not been examined in detail in its political context. Cf. ADRIAN GUELKE, Northern Ireland : the 
international perspective 165-167  (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1988); MALCOLM D. EVANS & 
RODNEY MORGAN, Preventing torture : a study of the European Convention for the Prevention of 
Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Cambridge: Claernedong Press, 1998). 
53
 For an overview of the relevant political processes: MICHAEL BARNETT & MARTHA FINNEMORE, 
³3ROLWLFDO$SSURDFKHV´LQThomas G. Weill and Sam Daws eds.,The Oxford handbook on the United 
Nations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
54
 MJ PETERSON, The UN General Assembly, (New York: Routledge, 2006) at 79; BOYD, supra note 51; 
WAYNE SANDHOLTZ & ALEC STONE SWEET, ³/DZ SROLWLFV DQG LQWHUQDWLRQDO JRYHUQDQFH´, in 
Christian Reus-Smit ed., The Politics of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004). 
55
 As Barnett and Finnemore note, there is a shortage of specific research on the internal politics of the 
UN organs. BARNETT & FINNEMORE, supra note 52, at 52. 
Page 13 of 44 
 
should not detract from its significance; in a context of contested sovereignty, this 
preliminary question of whether an issue is appropriate for international rather than 
purely domestic consideration itself goes to the heart of the substantive disagreement 
between the contending states56. 
 
In both fora, the arguments crystallised around the implications of Article 2(7) of the 
81&KDUWHUZKLFKSUHFOXGHV81LQWHUYHQWLRQLQµPDWWHUVZKLFKDUHHVVHQWLDOO\ZLWKLQ
the dRPHVWLFMXULVGLFWLRQRIDQ\VWDWH¶7KH8.FODLPZDVWKDW$UWLFOHSUHFOXGHG
UN discussion of the issue, an argument which had enjoyed only limited success in 
other cases57. Irish arguments challenged this claim, both by directly challenging the 
image of Northern Ireland as a domestic concern, and by relying on alternative legal 
bases, including Articles 33 and 34 (dealing with the pacific settlement of disputes), 
Article 55 (dealing with human rights), and GA Resolution 1514(XV) (on the 
granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples). 
 
3.1 Northern Ireland and the United Nations: Emerging Thinking 
 
These initiatives represent the only formal attempt by an Irish government to raise 
Northern Ireland at the UN58. Given the duration of the issue, as a semi-dormant 
territorial claim before 1969, and as a violent sectarian conflict for almost three 
decades thereafter, this might seem somewhat surprising59 . A territorial claim to 
Northern Ireland had been a fixture in Irish political discourse since independence in 
DQGLQWKDWFODLPZDVLQFRUSRUDWHGLQWKHVWDWH¶VFRQVWLWXWLRQ60. The issue 
had been pressed extensively, to little effect, by Irish representatives at the Council of 
Europe in the 1940s 61 . However, while it was occasionally mentioned in Irish 
contributions at the UN, it was never sought to raise it formally. 
 
This reflected a recognition on the part of successive governments that there was little 
which the UN could do to end partition, together with a more general reluctance to 
press the issue too hard62. This point was recognised in 1946, when joining the UN 
                                                 
56
 UK analyses implicitly recognised this point: Letter Crowe to Stratton (27 September 1971) Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office (FCO58/614/33). 
57
 See PETERSON, supra note 53, at 69; ROSALYN HIGGINS, ³,QWHUYHQWLRQ LQ ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ´ LQ 
Hedley Bull ed., Intervention in World Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984) 36 
58
 GUELKE,  supra note 51, at 111-112. 
59
 On partition in Anglo-Irish relations, RONAN FANNING, ³Anglo-Irish Relations : Partition and the 
%ULWLVK'LPHQVLRQLQ+LVWRULFDO3HUVSHFWLYH´, (1985) 2 Irish Studies in International Affairs 1 
60
 KORNPROBST, ³Episteme, nation-builders and national identity´ supra note 47, at 411; GARETH 
IVORY, ³Revisions in nationalist discourse among Irish political parties´, (1999) 14 Irish Political 
Studies 84, at 85. 
61
 JOSEPH MORRISON SKELLY, Irish diplomacy at the United Nations, 1945-1965 : national interests 
and the international order (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1997) at 22   
62
 Ibid., 88. CONOR CRUISE O'BRIEN & FELIKS TOPOLSKI, The United Nations: sacred drama (London: 
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was first considered, and as late as April 1969, Minister of External Affairs Frank 
$LNHQ ZDV DUJXLQJ WKDW µWKH DGRSWLRQ RI D 8QLWHG 1DWLRQV UHVROXWLRQ ZRXOG >QRW@
contribute to WKHUHVWRUDWLRQRI,ULVKXQLW\¶63. 
 
The deteriorating security situation was the catalyst for subsequent shifts in Irish 
government attitudes towards the UN option, and in its Northern Ireland policy 
generally64. Public order and inter-community relations in Northern Ireland had been 
deteriorating over a number of years, a process stimulated by the emergence of a 
Catholic civil rights movement, and serious rioting had occurred on a number of 
occasions in 1968 and earlier in 196965. These developments were reflected in a shift 
in Irish government attitudes, from a conciliatory policy in the mid-1960s towards a 
more explicitly anti-partitionist and irredentist position. 
 
An initial step towards internationalising the issue was taken in April 1969 when, in 
response to unrest and troop deployments in Northern Ireland, Aiken met with 
Secretary General U Thant to brief him on the situation. However, no attempt was 
made to raise the issue formally in any UN organ on the basis that this was unlikely to 
achieve meaningful international action, and would potentially jeopardise 
North/South relations66. 
 
Two developments occurred over the next four months which led directly to the UN 
initiatives. The first was the increasing linkage in Irish thinking of the short-term 
question of civil rights for the Catholic minority in Northern Ireland with the wider 
question of partition, which came to be characterised as the root cause of the civil 
rights problems 67 . The second, closely linked, was a loss of confidence in the 
possibility of substantial reforms, and a continued reluctance on the part of the 
London government to engage with Dublin on the issue68. 
 
The immediate background to the decision to raise the issue at the SC was the 
outbreak on 12 August of the worst sectarian rioting to date, and the deployment of 
British Army troops to maintain order in Northern Ireland. It followed a public 
request, made during an emergency Irish cabinet meeting on 13 August, that the UK 
itself seek a UN peace-keeping force, or alternatively accept a joint British-Irish force 
in Northern Ireland69. The urgent nature of that meeting, characterised by political 
divisions within the cabinet, the absence of (recently appointed) Minister for External 
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 Irish Parliament Dáil Debates vol. 240 col. 6 (29 April 1969).  
64
 KENNEDY, supra note 51, at 301 et seq. 
65
 JOSEPH LEE, Ireland, 1912-1985 : politics and society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
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 KENNEDY,  supra note 51, at 325-327; FANNING, supra note 51, at 69. 
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Affairs Patrick Hillery, and reliance on limited and apparently exaggerated accounts 
of the situation in Northern Ireland, makes it difficult to see this move as part of a 
considered political strategy. Its primary purpose seems to have been to reassure both 
the Irish public and the cabinet themselves that the government could take effective 
action in respect of the Northern Ireland situation. 
 
However, the subsequent decision to raise the issue formally at the SC, and thereafter 
at the GA, reflects a broader objective70. The initiative at the SC was framed as a 
request for the despatch of a UN peace-keeping force to Northern Ireland, something 
which it was recognised was impossible over the objections of the UK71. However, it 
ZDVDUJXHGWKDWWKH81µZDVDQLQWHUQDWLRQDOIRUXPDQGLWZRXOGEHRIKHOSWRKDYH
WKHPDWWHUGLVFXVVHGDQGFRQVLGHUHGWKHUH¶72. In part, no doubt, this reflects a further 
attempt to reassure domestic opinion. However, it also reflects an attempt to reframe 
the Anglo-Irish dialogue on Northern Ireland through the UN737KH8.¶VUHOXFWDQFH
to discuss Northern Ireland affairs with Dublin had been an issue since earlier in the 
year, and would continue to be so74. When Hillery sought to discuss the deteriorating 
situation with UK ministers, both before and after 12 August, they made a point of 
arguing that Northern Ireland was a domestic matter and that, in the words of Foreign 
6HFUHWDU\0LFKDHO6WHZDUWµWKHUHLVDOLPLWWRWKHH[WHQWWRwhich we can discuss with 
RXWVLGHUVHYHQRXUQHDUHVWQHLJKERXUVWKLVLQWHUQDOPDWWHU¶ 75. There is a fundamental 
disconnect evident in accounts of these meetings between this UK characterisation, 
and the Irish view that the two jurisdictions were linked, and that the Irish government 
had a legitimate interest in the situation. Contemporary analyses from both states 
highlight the extent to which the Irish saw the UN as a means of engaging the UK, 
and pressing them to respond to Irish concerns, whether directly or through their 
lobbying of third-states; and Irish accounts highlight British engagement with third-
states as a significant benefit which the initiatives yielded 76 . The UN initiatives 
represent an attempt to shift the Anglo-Irish dialogue to a different forum, where the 
UK could not simply refuse discussion. 
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3.2 From Domestic Discourse to International Law as Common Language 
 
By shifting that dialogue to the UN, these initiatives also shifted it, at least in part, 
from the political to the legal field. How far this was the Irish objective is unclear; 
certainly there was a recognition that, in many respects, a political rather than a legal 
consideration would better serve the Irish case77. However, by invoking Article 2(7), 
the UK characterised the Irish initiatives in legal terms; thereafter, other states also 
came to perceive themselves as acting within a legalised environment, and so engaged 
with it in those terms.  
International law provided a framework of concepts within which each state sought to 
build support for its position. The relevant concepts, including human rights, 
sovereignty, territoriality and intervention, are of course also intensely political; but to 
the extent that states interpreted the situation in generalized terms, and advocated or 
opposed action on the basis of those interpretations and of their relation to Article 
2(7), the discourse can be properly characterised as legal. To build support for 
discussion, the Irish government characterised the issue in terms of human rights, self 
determination and colonialism, categories which might be accepted as justifying UN 
involvement; while the UK characterised it as domestic, and the Irish reference as 
inappropriately political, in order to forestall discussion. 
 
However, neither state could address their claims solely to the legal context of the UN 
organs; they were also concerned that the arguments invoked be compatible with their 
broader international and domestic characterisation of the issue. Arguments made in 
the international sphere both reflect and constitute arguments made to domestic 
constituents, and as such must be compatible not only with the categories adopted in 
the international context, but also with the overriding themes in domestic discourse. 
In the Irish case, this generated a tension between the human rights and political 
issues, while for the UK it manifested in a particular concern to stand on Article 2(7). 
 
Both recognised that the Northern Ireland situation could be characterised in two 
ways: as a humanitarian issue, whether with respect to civil rights generally or to the 
immediate crisis; or as a political issue, involving partition and the Irish territorial 
claim over Northern Ireland. Both also recognised that it would be more difficult for 
the UK to oppose discussion of the humanitarian issue78. This reflected a rapidly 
developing UN consensus that human rights were an issue of legitimate international 
concern79. However, given that at least part of the Irish objective was to reframe the 
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debate on the political question and challenge the idea that Northern Ireland was a 
purely internal matter, an exclusive focus on humanitarian issues would have defeated 
that purpose80. Further, domestic pressure from both within and outside government 
to raise the wider political questions was intense81. A subsequent Irish analysis notes 
WKDWµWRKDYHLJQRUHGSDUWLWLRQDOWRJHWKHUDQGGHDOWRQO\ZLWKFLYLOULJKWVZRXOGKDYH
been a repudiation of our own beliefs, an invitation to the British to try to solve the 
problem without any regard to political considerations, and an admission to all the 
people living in [Northern Ireland] that we could contemplate an acceptable solution 
of their problems which did not in any way upset the constitutional arrangements 
H[LVWLQJRYHUWKHSDVWILIW\\HDUV¶82. 
 
There was thus a divergence between the characterisation of this issue in Irish 
domestic thinking and the international law framework in which the case fell to be 
made. The Irish response was to collapse the humanitarian and constitutional 
questions together, building from a focus on human rights, and in the SC on 
international peace and security, to challenge the broader political settlement. Thus, 
the request for discussion in the SC highlights the connection between the outbreak of 
violence in the precedLQJ GD\V DQG WKH µtreatment which a high proportion of the 
inhabitants of the area have suffered over a period of almost fifty years¶83. Similarly, 
WKH*$([SODQDWRU\0HPRUDQGXPDUJXHVWKDWµthe root cause of the demonstrations 
and unrest in the North is WKHXQMXVWSDUWLWLRQRI,UHODQG¶ µUHXQLILFDWLRQ JLYHV WKH
only hope for the evolution of balanced political and social relations ... in accordance 
with the principles of the Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples¶84. 
The political argument is linked inevitably to the legal bases, in terms of charter 
principles, human rights and decolonisation, which justify consideration by the 
Assembly85. 
 
This attempt to link the two aspects also features prominently in Irish confidential 
lobbying. Thus, ahead of the SC meeting Irish representatives were arguing that the 
FRQVWLWXWLRQDOTXHVWLRQµZDVDWWKHURRWRIWKHPDWWHUDQGQRORQJWHUPVROXWLRQFRXOG
be found without tackling this basic issue¶86+LOOHU\KLPVHOIQRWHGWKDWµI have been 
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stressing all the time [in private lobbying] that the Human Rights questions had their 
origin in the political and would have their solution in a political solution¶87. To argue 
directly for consideration of the political question would be exceptional, but by 
casting it in terms of human rights it is brought within an accepted basis of 
jurisdiction. There is evidence that a number of states were swayed by this analysis88; 
and that challenging this framing was a significant focus of UK lobbying89. 
 
The need for coherence between the international and domestic discourses also 
explains why, while the Explanatory Memorandum refers to colonialism, Irish 
representatives did not emphasise this argument, either publicly or privately. This 
SDUWO\UHIOHFWHGGRXEWVDERXWWKHDUJXPHQW¶VFUHGLELOLW\KRZHYHUJLYHQWKHSRZHURI
anti-colonial arguments in the GA in this period, this explanation is insufficient90. 
More significant in Irish thinking was concern at the prejudicial effect that 
characterising Northern Ireland Unionists as colonists would have in domestic and 
North-South relations 91 . A powerful international argument was discounted for 
domestic political reasons. 
 
The UK, in its lobbying, stood firmly on Article 2(7), emphasising the status of 
Northern Ireland as an integral part of the UK. This was not simply a tactical move. 
Any suggestion that Northern Ireland was not an integral part of the UK has 
historically raised serious concerns for Northern Ireland¶V Unionist community.92 
Invoking Article 2(7) reflected a commitment given to the Unionist government of 
Northern Ireland that the UK would assert its domestic jurisdiction in all international 
relationships 93 . In considering responses to the Irish initiatives, a number were 
rejected on the basis that, while desirable from an international point of view, they 
would contradict that domestic imperative 94 . Article 2(7) becomes a powerful 
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domestic symbol, which the UK is compelled to invoke, even where doing so may 
undermine its international position. 
 
In order to sustain this position on article 2(7), UK lobbying drew a sharp distinction 
between the humanitarian and political aspects of the situation. The humanitarian 
issue, they accepted, was within the jurisdiction of the General Assembly (but not the 
Security Council); the political question was strictly a domestic matter95. In order to 
address the humanitarian aspects, emphasis was placed on the fact that the UK was 
competent to restore order, while the potential colonial and self-determination 
DUJXPHQWVZHUHIRUHVWDOOHGE\UHIHUHQFHWR1RUWKHUQ,UHODQG¶VSRVLWLRQZLWKLQWKH8.
and Irish acceptance of partition since 192196. In each case, the rhetorical strategy 
involved the identification of Northern Ireland with, or its distinction from, a legally 
relevant class of situations; and the argument that this classification placed it outside 
WKH81¶VMXULVGLFWLRQ$UHFXUULQJWKHPHZDVWKDWDFWLRQDQGHYHQFRQVLGHUDWLRQE\
WKH81ZDVµQHLWKHUQHFHVVDU\VLQce the UK is capable of restoring order and is in 
fact doing do) or appropriate (since the affairs of NI are an internal matter within the 
GRPHVWLF MXULVGLFWLRQRI WKH8.¶97; there were neither legal nor pragmatic grounds 
for the UN to become involved. 
 
Thus, the arguments made by each state in the UN fora, both publicly and privately, 
reflected a tension between their domestic characterisations of the issue and the 
available legal concepts. They represent an attempt to translate particularist domestic 
perspectives, reflected in the quotes which opened this Part, into the shared normative 
framework of international law. The very different legal interpretations offered 
represent not only tactical manoeuvring at the international level, but also 
fundamentally different domestic political interpretations of the Northern Ireland 
situation. 
 
Why does this process matter? 
 
The importance of expressing arguments in shared legal terms lies in the fact that it is 
at least partly in these terms that other states came to understand, and to respond to, 
the issue. Thus, for example, in discussions with the UK, Danish officials noted that 
Irish arguments had failed to address Article 2(7) 98 . Even though Denmark was 
                                                 
95
 Telegram New York to FCO (17 August 1969), Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 
(FCO33/772/19); Telegram FCO to Paris (17 August 1969), Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 
(FCO33/772/34). 
96
 Telegram New York to FCO (17 August 1969), Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 
(FCO33/772/19); Telegram FCO to Bogota (18 August 1969), Telegram New York to FCO (17 August 
1969), Foreign and Commonwealth Office, (FCO33/772/49); Telegram FCO to Certain Missions (18 
August 1969), Foreign and Commonwealth Office, (FCO33/772/73). 
97
 Telegram FCO to New York (17 August 1969), Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 
(FCO33/772/33).  
98
 Telegram Copenhagen to FCO (12 September 1969), Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 
(FCO33/773/205). 
Page 20 of 44 
 
traditionally very liberal on inscription, and so sympathetic to the Irish case, they still 
approached the issue in these terms; therefore, it was in these terms that they needed 
to be convinced. Conversely the Netherlands, while accepting the political and 
practical merit of UK arguments, sought further explanation of how what was 
characterised as a human rights case could legitimately be denied discussion under 
Article 2(7)99; only after further lobbying highlighting the distinctions between the 
political and humanitarian issues did they agree to support the UK position100. 
 
Demonstrating the significance of these legal accounts in shaping third-state attitudes 
is difficult. While it is possible to show states changing their positions in the course of 
the lobbying, it is impossible to control for extraneous factors shaping those positions. 
 
The nuanced positions which many states adopted suggest that they were influenced 
by these arguments. Thus, United States representatives indicated to both delegations 
that they could not support discussion of the Irish request in the GA, on the basis that 
it emphasised the political aspect of the Northern Ireland question, and so brought it 
within Article 2(7). However, they indicated their position might be different if it 
were focussed more clearly on the humanitarian aspects101. A number of other states 
took similarly nuanced positions, drawing fine distinctions over the classification of 
the issue as either political or humanitarian, and the appropriate treatment of it102. 
 
It is difficult to explain these attitudes without assuming that legal arguments carry 
VRPH ZHLJKW 1RQH UHSUHVHQWV D FRPSOHWH DFFHSWDQFH DQG VXSSRUW RI HLWKHU VWDWH¶V
view. Rather, they represent reasoned understandings, suggesting that different 
positions will be adopted on the question, depending on how it is framed and what 
action the UN is asked to take. It is important to note that the inscription of a specific 
human rights item would still represent a defeat for the UK, against which they were 
lobbying hard103; however, whereas many states conceded the merit RI WKH 8.¶V
arguments against a political item, they were not prepared to oppose a human rights 
item. While definite evidence of the causal impact of competing arguments is 
unavailable, the responses of other states suggest that they were at least significant. 
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3.3 Precedent and the Dynamics of Legal Argument 
 
[NAME] 3HWHUVGLVWLQJXLVKHVWZRFODVVHVRIGLVFRXUVHLQPRGHUQOHJDOV\VWHPVµ2Q
the one hand we have political discourses which aim at legislation ± that is, at 
forward-looking changes in the law ... On the other hand we have a multiplicity of 
discourses where interpretation of pre-JLYHQ ODZ LV DW VWDNH¶ 104 . In the relatively 
underdeveloped international legal system, the legislative and interpretive processes 
intersect through concerns and arguments about precedent105. These guide specific 
choices, by directing attention backwards, to the context of previous situations, and 
forwards, to potential implications in future cases. This is not an automatic process; in 
the same way that common-law advocates argue over the ratio decidendi of a case, 
international actors will invoke, and distinguish, previous decisions which they argue 
are of a type, and draw attention to potential future decisions which might fall to be 
decided by analogy 106 . Further, as the discussion below highlights, precedential 
argument is important in understanding VWDWHV¶ decisions, but it cannot uniquely 
determine these. Rather, by linking specific issues to underlying interests and values it 
shapes how they understand their choices. 
 
The precedential arguments in this case can be divided into two classes, prospective 
and retrospective: prospective arguments invoke hypothetical future decisions; 
retrospective arguments reference specific prior statements, decisions and practices. 
 
Prospective arguments may be addressed either to the special interests of particular 
VWDWHVRU WR DPRUHGLIIXVHVHQVHRI VWDWHV¶ FRPPRQ LQWHUHVWV7KXV8.DUJXPHQWV
focussed explicitly on potential parallels with situations in other member states; the 
lobbying instrucWLRQV DW WKH 6& VXJJHVWHG WKDW UHSUHVHQWDWLYHV µask whether a UN 
force would be welcome in some local city or area merely because of civil 
disturbances with which the government was quite competent to deal¶107. Prior to the 
*$WKH\VXJJHVWHGµ[r]eference might be made to a particular minority problem in the 
territory of the state concerned¶108. Precedent serves to link disparate instances of a 
common kind, forcing states to consider how the present decision may impact on 
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other cases within the relevant class.109 The UK thus sought to draw the relevant class 
DV ZLGHO\ DV SRVVLEOH VR HPSKDVL]LQJ WKH SUHFHGHQW¶V GLVUXSWLYH SRWHQWLDO ,W ZDV
IUDPHGDVµ81LQWHUYHQWLRQLQFDVHVZKHUHDKRPHJRYHUQPHQWLVKDQGOLQJDGLIILFXOW
LQWHUQDO VHFXULW\ SUREOHP¶ 110 . It raised µD ³PLQRULWLHV TXHVWLRQ´ RQ WKH FODVVLFDO
pattern¶DQGµ[i]f this precedent were once to be established, there could hardly be a 
member of the UN who would not have a domestic problem of its own similarly 
eligible for examination¶111. A similar rhetorical strategy was evident in the SC where 
WKH 8. UHSUHVHQWDWLYH DUJXHG WKDW µWR EUHDFK WKH SULQFLSOH RI GRPHVWLF MXULVGLFWLRQ
would have most serious consequences not only for individual members of this 
&RXQFLOEXWIRUWKH8QLWHG1DWLRQVLWVHOI¶112. What is at stake is more than a narrow 
UK concern; it is a matter of principle on which all states share an interest. 
 
The effectiveness of such arguments is evident from the records. Nigeria may be 
FOHDUHVWH[DPSOHWKH,ULVKDQDO\VLVQRWHVWKDWµNigeria was standing rigidly on Article 
2(7) ... to prevent discussion of [the Nigeria-Biafra civil war] at the United Nations¶
in these circumstances, Nigerian support for inscription was not expected113. If Article 
2(7) permitted discussion of the civil disturbances in Northern Ireland then a fortiori 
it must permit discussion of the far more serious situation in Biafra. In response to 
British lobbying drawing explicit parallels to Biafra, Nigeria did indeed agree to 
oppose inscription114. 
 
Even in states without an ongoing interest in Article 2(7), precedent featured 
SURPLQHQWO\7KXVIRUH[DPSOHWKH8.FRQFOXGHGWKDWµbecause of the analogy with 
the South Tyrol¶$XVWULDZDVXQOLNHO\VXSSRUWWKH%ULWLVKSRVLWLRQZKHUHDVItaly, on 
the opposite side of that dispute, argued NorWKHUQ,UHODQGµshould not be discussed at 
the UN as a question of ³self-GHWHUPLQDWLRQ´EHFDXVHRI WKH LPSOLFDWLRQVIRU >6RXWK
Tyrol]¶115. 
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In the view of the officials involved, a number of other states were also moved by 
these prospective arguments116; even the United States, in subsequent discussions, 
placed some weight on them117. 
 
One might argue that this behaviour, while it indicates the importance of precedent, 
does not necessarily support the importance of argument. The effect of precedent may 
be simply to lengthen the shadow of the future, allowing cooperation to develop on 
the basis of mutual self-interest118. However, in this respect the process by which the 
precedent is defined and interpreted is important. To be concerned that a precedent 
may subsequently be invoked against them, an agent must first connect the specific 
issue under consideration both to the wider class of issues of which it forms part, and 
to their own particular interests. It is through the process of argument, in terms of 
shared international law concepts, that these links are made. 
 
This links to another point raised earlier: it is not necessary that states share 
underlying values or interests, provided they share a common frame of reference, and 
FDQ FRPSUHKHQG RQH DQRWKHU¶V LQWHUHVWV Thus, for example, UK lobbying by 
reference to Biafra need not represent a common understanding of that conflict; rather, 
it represents a recognition that agreement could be built precisely on the basis of 
disparate understandings. 
 
This point is perhaps clearest in discussions of lobbying the Soviet Union. Standing 
UK practice in this period was not to lobby Eastern bloc states. However, recognising 
WKDWWKH\KDGµVWURQJIHHOLQJV¶RQWKHTXHVWLRQRIGRPHVWLFMXULVGLFWLRQDGHFLVLRQZDV
made to approach them in this instance119. Subsequent analyses outline the thinking 
behind this decision. First, it was recognised that the value the Soviets placed on 
domestic jurisdiction might lead them to support the UK, notwithstanding the 
propaganda value of a UN discusVLRQRI1RUWKHUQ,UHODQG6HFRQGLWZDVIHOWWKDWµif 
[the Soviet Union] were to refuse to support us on this issue, we could the more easily 
refuse to pay regard to any representations they make to us about action taken at the 
UN over human rights questiRQVZLWKLQWKH8665¶120µZKDWHYHUGHFLVLRQWKH\WRRN
[Britain] could profit from it now (if they voted against inscription) or later (if they 
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voted for inscription)¶121. The legal context of the UN, in which precedents carry 
significant weight, meant that the Soviets would be forced to choose between 
attacking the UK and supporting a principle which they valued; while the UK sought 
to build agreement at the level of principle despite diametrically opposed interests in 
the specific case. Or, putting the same point in different terms, the prevalence of 
precedential reasoning forces states to reconceive their interests in terms of legal 
principles rather than specific instances. The dilemma is political; but it is through 
legal discourse that the dilemma is constituted. 
 
The second class of precedential arguments identified are retrospective, suggesting 
that current decisions are constrained by past practice. 
 
These include, for example, UK concern at arguments made by the Foreign Secretary 
at the previous GA that µQRFRXQWU\FDQVD\WKDWWKHKXPDQULJKWVRILWVFLWL]HQVDUHDQ
exclusively domestic concern. A country that denies its citizens the basic human 
ULJKWV LV  LQEUHDFKRIDQLQWHUQDWLRQDOREOLJDWLRQ¶)URPWKHWLPH81LQYROYHPHQW
was first mooted in April 1969, UK officials recognised that this statement might pose 
difficulties; once having pressed this argument, it would be difficult for the UK now 
to oppose discussion of its own human rights issues122. Irish representatives made 
liberal use of this precedent in lobbying at both SC and GA; and responses from other 
delegations suggest it carried significant weight123. The UK, on the other hand, sought 
to distinguish it, arguing the Irish initiatives raised a different and wider issue.124 
 
The logic of this point is worth highlighting. It is not simply about the UK complying 
with a norm that it previously espoused, although UK officials clearly felt the need to 
be consistent125 ; rather, other states oriented themselves towards the question by 
reference to previous UK views. While the UK could, and did, argue that these 
specific humanitarian issues should not be discussed, the perceived inconsistency 
reduced the force of its argument. 
 
States can also invoke their own precedents to justify their behaviour, arguing that 
they are constrained by past practice. Thus, both France and the US argued, prior to 
the SC discussion, that their positions on inscription were constrained by past practice; 
                                                 
121
 Letter Warner to Hayman (25 August 1969), Foreign and Commonwealth Office, (FCO33/772/160). 
122
 0HPRUDQGXPµ8OVWHUDQGWKH8QLWHG1DWLRQV¶:DUEXUWRQWR0DF*ODVKDQ(22 April 1969), Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office, (FCO33/772/1). 
123
 *$ 1RWH 1R  µ7KH 6LWXDWLRQ LQ 1RUWKHUQ ,UHODQG DW th 6HVVLRQ RI WKH *HQHUDO $VVHPEO\¶ (10 
September 1969), Department of External Affairs, (NA2002/19/534). 
124
 Telegram New York to FCO (17 August 1969), Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 
(FCO33/772/19); Telegram FCO to Paris (17 August 1969), Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 
(FCO33/772/34). 
125
 Telegram FCO to New York (20 August 1969), Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 
(FCO33/772/107). 
Page 25 of 44 
 
France was bound to oppose it, and the US to support126. In both cases, these legal 
arguments in part served as justifications for avoiding a politically difficult issue; the 
legal argument inoculates these states from political pressure. The US correspondence 
is particularly instructive in this regard. US representatives argued their past record on 
inscription meant they must support the Irish item; they supported the UK politically, 
but this was a matter of legal principle. The UK, in response, highlighted two 
occasions when the US had opposed inscription of agenda items 127 . This hardly 
constituted a significant practice. However, it served to disrupt the purported legal 
constraint on the US, shifting the question back from the legal to the political field. 
This argument, together with a strongly worded message from the Foreign Secretary, 
served to convince the US to abstain128. 
 
The precedents in these cases are not simply regulative, in the sense of guiding states 
to adopt particular positions; they are also constitutive, in that they define positions 
µRQSULQFLSOH¶WKHUHE\LQRFXODWLQJthem from political challenge. When positions are 
defended in these terms, it is by questioning their legal basis, rather than simply 
through political pressure, that they must be challenged. 
 
3.4 The Limits of Law: Politics and Power 
 
Precedent, then, ties specific instances to more general questions about the rules states 
want. It represents a broadening of the question to consider not only immediate 
implications, but also implications for other decisions that have been or will be made. 
However, legal principles are also interpreted, and indeed challenged, by reference 
not to the general but to the specific; by focussing not on the rule, but on the facts of 
the case at issue, and the implications action will have in that case. At the extreme, 
legal principles are excluded entirely, and a decision falls to be made on purely 
pragmatic grounds. 
 
This interaction of legal and political arguments is prominent in both lobbying and 
third-state decision-making in this case. Thus, for example, in discussions with US 
repUHVHQWDWLYHV 8. RIILFLDOV HPSKDVLVHG µthe incalculable dangers of any action 
ZKLFK FRXOG DSSHDU WR UHRSHQ WKH ³,ULVK 4XHVWLRQ´ DIWHU KDOI D FHQWXU\¶ 129 . In a 
subsequent appeal from the Foreign Secretary, the argument proceeded from the 
strictly legal claim about Article 2(7), through a precedential argument about 
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LQWHUYHQLQJ LQ GRPHVWLF GLVWXUEDQFHV WR D EURDGO\ GUDZQ SUDJPDWLF FODLP WKDW µ[a] 
debate in the Security Council at the present time will make our task of restoring law 
and order in Northern Ireland all the more difficult¶.130 Political values are set in 
opposition to any legalistic analysis which might allow discussion. This and similar 
arguments substantially impressed a number of governments; some appear to have 
focussed almost entirely on the practical issues, while others saw the two sets of 
arguments as complementary 131. Irish efforts similarly emphasised the potential value, 
for the people of Northern Ireland, of U.N. involvement, sidestepping the legal 
difficulties posed by Article 2(7) by reference to the overriding humanitarian 
question 132 . These points illustrate the extent to which the legal and political 
discourses are mutually implicated. Arguments and justifications move between the 
two, as actors seek to build support and challenge the positions adopted by others. 
Legal arguments may be discounted for practical reasons; but equally the importance 
of principle may provide a response to practical appeals. 
 
It is not only through recourse to non-legal argument that politics intrudes on 
deliberative discourse. It is also, more directly, through political influence and the 
explicit or implicit invocation of carrot and stick, moving from communication and 
argument towards strategic action and bargaining. 
 
The archival record is of limited assistance here, as there is little direct evidence of 
such factors. In a few cases the possibility of an explicit quid pro quo is mentioned, 
and in others there are suggestions that amicable relationships may sway support one 
way or another133. This lack of evidence does not show that such considerations were 
not relevant. Rather, it reflects the limits of archival research, which is very effective 
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at uncovering explicit claims made by agents, but less effective in identifying the 
rationales for decisions of states other than those whose archives are examined. 
 
By looking beyond this specific case, we can find indirect evidence that such 
influence was important, but not determinative. 
 
First, having regard to UN practice in this period generally, this case stands out as a 
relatively rare example of a failure to have an issue inscribed134. The exceptional 
nature of such cases leads Simma to H[SODLQ WKHP LQ WHUPV RI µVSHFLILF SROLWLFDO
DOOLDQFHV¶ UDWKHU WKDQ µSULQFLSOHG OHJDODVVHVVPHQW¶135. Both their rarity, and the fact 
they have generally occurred only where leading western states have opposed 
discussion, suggests political influence is an important explanation. 
 
Second, potentially instructive, albeit indirect, evidence comes from a historical post-
script in the UK records. Having pre-empted thes initiatives, the UK continued to 
monitor both the situation in Northern Ireland and the mood at the UN to be prepared 
if a further initiative were taken136. This seemed especially likely in the tense period 
following the introduction of internment in 1971, and various assessments of this 
possibility were prepared. These highlight three developments that suggested a new 
initiative might be more successful: first, a decline in UK influence at the UN 
generally; second, the worsening situation in Northern Ireland, and in particular 
border incidents and refugee flows which gave it an international quality; and third, 
the involvement of the UN in Bangladesh, with UK concurrence, which implied some 
widening of UN jurisdiction under Article 2(7)137. There is a clear recognition that the 
ORVVRILQIOXHQFHJHQHUDOO\PLJKWZHDNHQWKH8.FDVHOHDGLQJRWKHUVWRµUHLQWHUSUHW¶
the Northern Ireland situation in colonial terms. However, these assessments also 
suggest that the legal analysis is crucial; it is not just the diminution of UK influence, 
but also changes in the legal background and in the legal implications of events in 
Northern Ireland, which are a cause for concern. 
 
4. Ireland v United Kingdom at the European Convention on Human Rights 
 
In December 1971, the Irish government took the first steps in a case against the 
United Kingdom under the European Convention on Human Rights (the ECHR). The 
case related to the introduction of internment without trial and the interrogation of 
terrorist suspects in Northern Ireland. It would ultimately be the subject of a report by 
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the European Commission on Human Rights (1976) finding that the UK had engaged 
in torture; and a judgement by the European Court of Human Rights (1978), the first 
such judgement in an inter-state case, replacing that finding with one of inhuman and 
degrading treatment. This was the second significant attempt by an Irish government 
to use international institutions to intervene in Northern Ireland affairs, and the first to 
use explicitly judicial procedures. 
4.1 Political Background 
 
Individual complaints have made up the vast majority of cases under the ECHR; 
between 1950 and 1999 there were 53,000 individual complaints, and only 21 inter-
state complaints138. Many of the interstate complaints have been made in the context 
of wider disputes, and thus have had strong political overtones; the human rights 
claims have been subsumed within the wider dispute, and become instrumental to that 
dispute139. Nine have related to territories the sovereignty of which was contested by 
the complaining state, and have been brought by smaller states against larger and 
more powerful ones140. 
 
7KHFDWDO\VWIRU,UHODQG¶VGHFLVLRQWREULQJDQLQWHUVDWHFRPSODLQWwas the introduction 
of internment without trial by the Northern Ireland government on 9 August 1971. 
The background was a rapidly deteriorating security situation in Northern Ireland over 
the previous two years; the re-emergence of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) as an 
active paUDPLOLWDU\ RUJDQLVDWLRQ DQG WKH OLPLWHG VXFFHVV RI WKH %ULWLVK $UP\¶V
counter-insurgency efforts. While internment may have temporarily strengthened the 
Unionist government in Northern Ireland, it further alienated the Catholic minority. 
The one-sided way it was implemented, initially directed entirely against members of 
the minority, was perhaps MXVWLILHG E\ WKH ,5$¶V SRVLWLRQ DV WKH PRVW DFWLYH 
paramilitary group at the time; but it also reinforced perceptions of discrimination on 
the part of the security services141. 
 
In addition, allegations of brutality by army and police officers, and the use of 
FRQWURYHUVLDO µGHHS LQWHUURJDWLRQ¶ WHFKQLTXHV NQRZQ DV WKH µILYH WHFKQLTXHV¶
involving hooding and the subjection of detainees to white noise and physical stress, 
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rapidly generated public outrage within Ireland, Northern Ireland and Great Britain142. 
A combination of domestic public pressure and Irish diplomatic pressure led to a 
series of public inquiries to consider those allegations. These ultimately concluded 
that ill-treatment had occurred; however, the first of these, the Compton Report, went 
to great lengths to argue that this ill-WUHDWPHQW KDG QRW DPRXQWHG WR µEUXWDOLW\¶ D
conclusion heavily criticised by Lord Gardiner in his minority report for the 
subsequent Parker Committee143. 
 
On the same day that internment was introduced in Northern Ireland, Sean MacBride, 
a former Irish Minister of External Affairs and chairman of Amnesty International, 
wrote to Taoiseach (Prime Minister) Jack Lynch urging him to consider bringing a 
case under the ECHR144. While that letter did not refer specifically to internment, over 
subsequent weeks the possibility of bringing a case was repeatedly urged on the 
government, both publicly and privately145. 
 
The evolution of government thinking is well illustrated by the responses to this 
correspondence. On 12 August, Lynch wrote to MacBride indicating that, due to the 
SHUFHLYHG OHJDO LPSHGLPHQWV WKH OLNHO\ GHOD\ LQYROYHG DQG µUHOHYDQW SROLWLFDO
FRQVLGHUDWLRQV¶WKH*RYHUQPHQWGLGQRWµconsider that it would be advisable, at least 
DW WKH SUHVHQW¶ WR EULQJ D FDVH146. This line was maintained through August and 
September 1971. However, by October it had shifted, with correspondence indicating 
WKDWµWKHTXHVWLRQRIWRUWXUHRURWKHULOO-treatment of people in the North, [was] being 
DFWLYHO\SXUVXHGE\ WKH*RYHUQPHQW¶147. On 21 October Patrick Hillery indicated in 
parliament that the possibility of bringing a case was being seriously considered, but 
that no final decision had been reached148. However, government thinking clearly 
remained mixed; as late as 23 November the Tanaiste (Deputy Prime Minister) 
Erskine Childers was arguing that diplomatic pressure, in respect of both internment 
and the wider constitutional situation of Northern Ireland, should be prioritised over 
WKHµOHQJWK\DQGWLPHFRQVXPLQJ¶SURFHGXUHXQGHUWKH(&+5149. 
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What explains these shifting attitudes? Part of the answer lies in the failure of 
diplomatic approaches in respect of internment and the treatment of detainees. The 
draft notification of the case to the UK Government refers to previous contacts 
EHWZHHQ/\QFKDQG3ULPH0LQLVWHU7HG+HDWKDQG WKHIDFW WKDW WKH7DRLVHDFKµhad 
KRSHGWKDWKLVUHPDUNVRQWKLVVXEMHFW«ZRXOGKDYHKDGWKHHIIHFWRIHOLPLQDWLQJWKH
alleged behaviour¶150. Internment was raised with British ministers, both publicly and 
privately, on a number of occasions between August and November 1971, and the 
Irish felt that their views were not being taken on board151. The procedures under the 
ECHR offered a chance to raise these issues in a forum where British representatives 
could not simply refuse discussion, and where claims of necessity could be directly 
challenged. However, the case was also seen as a way of raising broader political and 
constitutional questionV DV HYLGHQFHG E\ WKH DUJXPHQW LQ WKH VDPH GUDIW WKDW µthe 
fundamental causes of strife in the North will yield only to political initiatives [which] 
should be designed to pull the North together and to set general Anglo-Irish relations 
on a progressive road to a better future¶:KLOHERWKUHIHUHQFHVZHUHGHOHWHGIURPWKH
ILQDOOHWWHUWRDYRLGVXJJHVWLQJWKHFDVHZDVEHLQJEURXJKWDVDµbargaining counter¶
they clearly demonstrate the extent to which it did indeed represent an attempt to 
bring additional pressure to bear on the UK government152. 
 
A second substantial objective was to respond to domestic pressure for action on these 
politically contentious issues. The failure to take a successful initiative in respect of 
internment and human rights during the autumn of 1971 resulted in increasing 
pressure on the government from both opposition and media sources153. 
 
The decision to bring the case was taken on 30 November, two weeks after the 
publication of the Compton Report, widely regarded as a whitewash.154 It also came a 
few days after the main opposition party, Fine Gael, itself sought to raise the issue by 
petition to the Council of Europe. A memorandum circulated at the cabinet meeting 
when the decision was taken highlights the diverse pressures on the government155. It 
notes that bringing a case would likely provoke a negative response from the UK, and 
was unlikely to be welcomed by the members of the EEC (to which both states were 
LQWKHSURFHVVRIDFFHGLQJ2QWKHSRVLWLYHVLGHLWZRXOGµLQHYLWDEO\PDNe the British 
PXFKPRUHFDUHIXOLQWKHLUKDQGOLQJRIGHWDLQHHVDQGLQWHUQHHVLQWKH1RUWK¶ZKLOHDW
the same time being popular with public opinion, both in Ireland and among the 
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minority in Northern Ireland. There is also a suggestion that a human rights case 
would make a security solution to the situation in Northern Ireland less viable, and so 
make a political initiative more likely. 
 
4.2 Translating Politics to Law 
 
A week later, on 7 December 1972, the Irish cabinet took an informal decision on the 
scope of the case, determining that claims should be brought under Articles 1, 2, 3 
and 14 of the ECHR156. These relate, respectively, to: the obligation to secure to 
everyone within the jurisdiction the rights and freedoms in the ECHR; the right to life; 
the prohibition on torture, inhuman and degrading treatment; and the prohibition on 
discrimination. Claims in respect of Articles 5 and 6 relating to the deprivation of 
liberty and the right to a fair trial were subsequently added. 
 
This represents a significantly broader claim than that previously canvassed in media 
or parliamentary debates. In shaping the case in these terms, the Irish government 
sought to legalise its challenge to a broad swathe of Northern Ireland policy, a point 
brought out in a memorandum prepared ahead of the 7 December cabinet meeting157. 
This notes various considerations affecting whether to bring claims under particular 
articles. Thus, in respect of Article 2, relating to the right to life, the advantages of a 
claim include the fact that it is very sought after by Northern Nationalists, and that it 
has special appeal to the public. The popular appeal of claims is also canvassed in 
respect of Articles 3 (torture) and 14 (discrimination). 
 
However, a broader interest in challenging the legitimacy of the Northern Ireland state 
is evident in the claim under Article 1. This claim was acknowledged as speculative 
and somewhat legalistic, and ultimately was rejected by both the Commission and the 
Court. However, including it was justified on the basis WKDWµ[t]he entire scope of the 
Special Powers Acts, with their regulations, could be opened before the Commission¶
DQGIXUWKHUWKDWLWµGHPRQVWUDWHVWKHJHQHUDOOHJDO³DWPRVSKHUH´ZKLFKSUHYDLOV¶7KH
Special Powers Acts constituted a central plank of the security apparatus of the 
Northern Ireland state, and were a major grievance of the Catholic civil rights 
movement 158 . Therefore, the opportunity to challenge those Acts represented an 
opportunity to impugn the legitimacy of a major facet of the Northern Ireland state. 
$VQRWHG LQFRQWHPSRUDU\8.DQDO\VHV WKH6SHFLDO3RZHUV$FWVZHUH µregarded in 
6RXWKHUQ P\WKRORJ\ DV WKH VHFRQG SLOODU « RI WKH 8QLRQLVW VWDWH¶ DQG DV VXFK D
FKDOOHQJH WR WKHP FRQVWLWXWHG SDUW RI D ZLGHU HIIRUW WR µdiscredit the Stormont 
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[Northern Ireland government] system and ensure that a Stormont with control over 
security will never return¶159. By casting the claim in broad terms, the legal challenge 
in respect of human rights became a political challenge to the legitimacy of the 
Northern Ireland state.160 
 
It seems clear from this analysis that actually winning any point was of seconday 
importance. The Article 1 claim was recognised as somewhat speculative, with the 
result impossible to anticipate. No real chance of success was anticipated on Article 2, 
on unlawful killings. On Article 14, non-discrimination, the evidence does not seem 
even to have been assessed. Rather, the value of the ECHR machinery was as a forum 
where claims could be made, and legitimacy contested, regardless of the ultimate 
legal result. Law is communicative, not regulative. Further, the contest for legitimacy 
is not simply legal; rather, it reflects a broader opportunity to co-opt the international 
institutions of political legitimacy in support of Irish positions161. 
 
The interaction between the political and legal context of the case is also evident in 
UK analyses, and in particular in discussions about how the UK case should be 
presented. 
 
This issue first arises in planning for the admissibility hearings in September 1972. 
The legal analysis of the British case was distinctly pessimistic, concluding that most, 
if not all, of the complaints would be found admissible. However, it was recognised 
that the rationale for making arguments at this stage extended beyond the purely legal, 
DQGWKDWLWµwould be politically undesirable to appear to be conceding the truth of the 
,ULVK DOOHJDWLRQ E\ IDLOLQJ WR FRQWHVW WKHP « >2@Q EDODQFH WKLV FRQVLGHUDWLRQ RXW-
weighed the disadvantage of apparently losing this stage of the argument¶162. The 
potential embarrassment of being seen to be publicly defeated was outweighed by the 
value of ensuring that the political arguments are fully aired. 
 
A similar tension emerges in discussions about making politically sensitive counter-
allegations in the proceedings, and in particular introducing material in the UK 
defence implying at least partial Irish responsibility for the emergency situation in 
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Northern Ireland 163 . These arguments, while legally irrelevant, were seen as 
SRWHQWLDOO\YDOXDEOHLQµ[pinning] a share of the blame¶RQWKH,ULVKJRYHUQPHQWDQG
thereby tempering the effect of the case on international opinion164. However, it was 
also recognised that responding to the Irish allegations in kind and doing so in a wide-
ranging and emotive manner was likely to further damage Anglo-Irish relations and 
future cooperation in respect of a Northern Ireland settlement. 
 
The concern that arguments made in Strasbourg would have implications for Anglo-
Irish relations and stability in Northern Ireland was a recurring theme in UK thinking, 
significantly tempering the presentation of the UK case. Thus, for example, in 
planning for the first stage of substantive hearings in October 1973, internal UK 
correspondence expresses concerns about the possible impact on the formation of a 
power-sharing executive in Northern Ireland in the same period. One possibility 
mooted was that, to avoid these tensions, the UK would simply refuse to take part in 
hearings. This was rejected, however, RQ WKH EDVLV WKDW µthe Commission could 
proceed without us [the UK] and some part of allegations against us on which we 
might win would go against us by default¶ 165 . This tension, between answering 
allegations that are made, strengthening the Anglo-Irish relationship, and reducing 
tensions on the ground in Northern Ireland, recurs throughout the proceedings. That 
there were contradictions inherent in the effort was recognised, but it was felt 
important that allegations made in a legal context be answered in kind 166 . The 
interaction of a legal process, which requires that claims be answered, and a political 
context, in which strengthening relationships and reducing tensions are paramount, 
generates a dilemma in which neither logic can fully control either the process or the 
outcomes. 
 
4.3 Evolving Thinking: The Threat and the Promise of Strasbourg 
 
Having initiated the proceedings at Strasbourg, the Irish government struggled to 
understand how the legal process could be brought to bear on the political situation in 
Northern Ireland. At the same time, UK analysis sought to understand the Irish 
motivations, both for bringing the case and for continuing it in the face of significant 
pressure, and the implications the case had from a UK perspective. 
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Thus, shortly after the admissibility stage, the Irish Attorney General pressed the view 
WKDWWKHFDVHµJDYHWKH,ULVK*RYHUQPHQWOHYHUDJHLQ$QJOR-Irish relations generally, 
and specifically a seat at the table in relation to discussions on the settlement of the NI 
GLIILFXOWLHV¶167. The case, and in particular the friendly settlement procedure, presented 
the prospect of direct bilateral discussions about the domestic administration of 
Northern Ireland. The ECHR, it was hoped, could provide both a forum and a 
normative framework for those discussions. 
  
The Irish government were also conscious that the case might, if allowed to run its 
course, yield limited practical benefit: in June 1973 Declan Costello, who had taken 
over as Attorney General under a Fine Gael/Labour coalition government earlier that 
year, noted that there were serious legal problems to be overcome, and further that 
µ>H@YHQLIZHGRVXFFHHGWKHUHVXOWZLOOEHPHUHO\DGHFODUDWLRQUHODWLQJWRDEUHDFK
RUEUHDFKHVE\WKH8.*RYHUQPHQW¶168. In these circumstances, a settlement was to be 
preferred if one could be obtained; and the best way to obtain such a settlement was to 
ensure that the case caused as much political difficulty as possible for the UK 
Government. 
 
Despite this analysis, which sees the case more in terms of strategic bargaining than 
any reasoned discourse, the Irish government also recognised that negotiations in 
respect of the case must be conducted within the framework, both institutional and 
QRUPDWLYHRI WKH(&+5LWVHOI7KXVZKLOH UHIHUULQJ WR WKHFDVHDVD µVWLFN¶ZKRVH
principal benefit was its embarrassment to the UK in their domestic, European and 
foreign policies, the terms of settlement which were anticipated related to such 
matters as compensation for the victims of abuse, incorporation of the ECHR in the 
domestic law of both ,UHODQG DQG 1RUWKHUQ ,UHODQG DQG µ>W@KH VHWWLQJ XS RI DQ $OO
,UHODQG&RXUW&RPPLVVLRQRQ+XPDQ5LJKWV¶169. The case constituted leverage, but 
it was a very particular type of leverage, which could be used only to achieve very 
particular objectives. 
 
The idea that the terms of settlement would need to be closely tied to the normative 
context of the ECHR recurs in later Irish thinking. Thus, immediately before the 
Commission issued its report, which the parties had been informed would find against 
the UK in respect of the torture claims but reject the broader Irish claims on 
internment and discrimination, Costello was still arguing that the only worthwhile 
settlement would be one in which the UK agreed to enact a bill of rights in Northern 
Irish law, and to establish an international tribunal to hear complaints under it. 
However, he also recognised that, if the UK were prepared to take such steps, they 
were more likely to be taken in the context of domestic political reform in Northern 
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Ireland than in settlement negotiations with the Irish government 170 . In these 
circumstances, pressing the case to a judgement was more valuable than any lesser 
settlement that might plausibly be offered. 
 
This represents a significant shift from the initial position outlined above. The case is 
no longer simply a bargaining chip, to be conceded in exchange for such concessions 
as can be obtained. Rather, it is seen as having autonomous value; only substantial 
concessions would justify foregoing the significant symbolic value of a decision. 
 
British analyses of the case focus on two issues: first, the motivations underlying the 
Irish position; and second, how the UK should respond. 
 
On the first point, a recurring theme was the recognition of the powerful domestic 
constraints on the Irish government. These were variously attributed to pressures from 
media and opposition sources, from nationalist opinion in Northern Ireland, and, 
under the Fianna Fáil government prior to 1973, from hard-line back bench TDs 
(members of parliament)171. However, there was also a recognition that the case was, 
for Ireland, a way of engaging with the UK. One of the clearest UK assessments 
suggests seven distinct Irish objectives, of which only one related to domestic politics. 
The major objectives were seen as (a) discrediting the system of government in 
Northern Ireland and ensuring a devolved administration with control of security 
would not return; (b) showing up ill-treatment by Northern Irish and British security 
forces, and ensuring it does not recur; FHVWDEOLVKLQJDµQHJRWLDWLQJSRVLWLRQ¶YLV-a-
YLV WKH 8. JRYHUQPHQW RQ 1RUWKHUQ ,UHODQG DIIDLUV LQ WKH IRUP RI D µULJKW WR EH
FRQVXOWHG¶Gµ>PDNLQJ@SXEOLFWKHZKROHGLUW\DIIDLUDQG>SULFNLQJ@WKHFRQVFLHQFHV¶
of the British public, the UK government, and world opinion generally; (e) affording a 
point of pressure against the UK Government; (f) appeasing domestic audiences; and 
JµJLYLQJWKH%ULWVRQHLQWKHH\H¶172. 
 
Only one of these, point (e), assumes the case will be used as a bargaining chip. The 
rest focus on its communicative potential: conveying and supporting ethical 
judgements about right behaviour; legitimising an Irish input into the Northern 
situation; and de-legitimising the previous administration in Northern Ireland. The 
perceived aim is not, or at least not primarily, to secure compliance or seek a quid-
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pro-quo; rather, it is to change the way the UK government, and UK and world 
opinion, think about the Northern Ireland situation and appropriate measures to 
respond to it. 
 
While the Irish government at all stages perceived significant potential value in the 
case, the British recognised it as potentially destabilising, but rejected the idea that it 
could be a source of leverage over them. This latter view is reiterated in public 
statements, in diplomatic correspondence, and in internal UK memoranda, in which 
WKH FDVH LV YDULRXVO\ FKDUDFWHULVHG DV µPXWXDOO\ HPEDUUDVVLQJ¶ DQ µLUULWDQW¶ RU DQ
µLUUHOHYDQFH¶173. 
 
However, while denying its significance, the UK was also faced with the question of 
how to respond to it. A range of options were canvassed at various stages, from 
refusing to participate in the proceedings to denouncing the ECHR as a whole174. 
There was a genuine concern that the case itself could become not only a source of 
friction in the Anglo-Irish relationship, but also a destabilising influence within 
Northern Ireland175. However, there was also a view, which ultimately prevailed, that 
,ULVK FODLPV FRXOG QRW EH DOORZHG WR JR XQDQVZHUHG µ7KLV VKRUW WHUP QHFHVVLW\ >WR
ILJKWWKHFDVHµHYHU\LQFKRIWKHZD\¶@ZRXOGUXQFRXQWHUWR>WKH@ORQJWHUPDLPRID
better working relationship with the Irish, but that better relationship would be more 
difficult to achieve if we did not dispute the allegations in the Irish State Case at 
6WUDVERXUJ¶176. This need to contest the case is variously tied to the need to uphold 
morale in the security services, to avoid conceding a point to Dublin, and to protect 
WKH8.JRYHUQPHQW¶V LQWHUQDWLRQDO UHSXWDWLRQ177. However, what is recognised at all 
stages is that legal claims, by their nature, require to be answered. To argue the point 
and lose would be a set-back; but it would be worse still to allow the point to go by 
default178. 
 
4.4 Constructing and Contesting the Legal Sphere 
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As in the UN case, the relation between law and politics, and the salience of legal 
analysis, was itself an object of discursive contestation. The UK government sought at 
all times to emphasise the connection between developments within the case at 
Strasbourg and the wider Northern Ireland and Anglo-Irish context. Whereas the Irish 
account of the case sought to establish the legal and political as distinct spheres, the 
UK argued for a holistic view, highlighting the negative impact the legal case could 
have, and thereby shifting the discussion from strictly legal questions, on which their 
position was weak, towards a focus on shared concerns and political contexts, where 
they could make a stronger case179. 
 
This approach appears in the first substantial prime-ministerial correspondence about 
the case in May 1973180. The political situation in Northern Ireland had developed 
significantly by this stage; the Northern Ireland parliament had been suspended the 
previous year, and the UK government was in the process of implementing plans, 
broadly supported by the Irish government, for a new devolved power-sharing 
administration181. The Fianna Fáil government which had been in power in 1971 had 
been replaced by a coalition of Fine Gael and Labour, marking a shift away from the 
irredentist rhetoric of earlier periods 182 . In these circumstances, it was thought 
worthwhile to approach the Irish government with a view to having the case 
withdrawn183. 
 
The terms in which this approach was framed illustrate the extent to which the UK 
sought to link the legal and political processes, and so to deny the autonomy of the 
legal field184. It begins by reciting in broad terms the range of ongoing political 
initiatives, cast in terms of common duties and joint hopes, arguing that these 
GHYHORSPHQWVDUH WKHPVHOYHVGHSHQGHQWRQ µSDVVLYHFRRSHUDWLRQ¶DQG WKHDYRLGDQFH
RI µsituations likely to bring [the] two governments into collision¶ ,W WKXV VHHNV WR
reframe the adversarial structure of the legal process in cooperative political terms.  
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 On the previous occasion when the UK was the object of an interstate case, brought by Greece over 
Cyprus, the case was treated purely as a legal matter: SIMPSON,  supra note 1, at 933. 
180
 The case was discussed briefly and inconclusively at a prime-ministerial meeting in March 1973: 
Letter Alexander to Roberts (23 May 19733ULPH0LQLVWHU¶V2IILFH35(015/2141). The framing of 
the legal process had previously been contested in official-level contacts and third-state diplomatic 
briefings: Letter Blatherwick to Bone (24 July 1972), Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 
(FCO87/140/W196); Telegram FCO to Certain Missions (6 December 1971), Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, (FCO87/136/W47) DUJXLQJ WKDW µLI WKH REMHFW RI WKH ZKROH H[HUFLVH LV WR
contribute to peace in Northern Ireland, Mr Lynch could have more usefully undertaken to do more to 
FRQWDLQWKH,5$VRXWKRIWKHERUGHU¶ 
181
 LEE,  supra note 64, at 435-445. 
182
 For the evolution of Irish official discourse on Northern Ireland, KORNPROBST, ³(SLVWHPHQDWLRQ-
EXLOGHUVDQGQDWLRQDOLGHQWLW\´supra note 43; KORNPROBST, ³Dejustification and Dispute Settlement´
supra note 43; IVORY, supra note 59; KATY HAYWARD, ³The politics of nuance: Irish official discourse 
on Northern Ireland´, (2004) 19 Irish Political Studies 18 
183
 Letter Alexander to Roberts (23 May 19733ULPH0LQLVWHU¶V2IILFH35(015/2141). 
184
 Telegram FCO to Dublin (30 May 19733ULPH0LQLVWHU¶V2IILFH35(015/2141). 
Page 38 of 44 
 
It goes on to make a number of arguments, some in legal or quasi-legal terms, and 
others which are firmly political and prudential. 
 
Remaining within the terms of the legal discourse constituted by the proceedings, it 
argues that the effect of the suspension of the Northern Ireland government has been 
to implicitly vary the terms of the complaint, so that it is no longer directed against 
that government, which was its original target, but rather against the ministers of the 
London government, something whicKLWVXJJHVWVWKH\µbitterly resent¶+RZHYHULWLV
not on the justice or injustice of these allegations that the primary weight of the 
DUJXPHQWLVEDVHG5DWKHULWLVLQWKHFRQVHTXHQWLDODUJXPHQWWKDWµto pursue a policy 
of cooperation with HMG [Her MaMHVW\¶V *RYHUQPHQW@ ZKLOH VLPXOWDQHRXVO\
pursuing allegations of torture and discrimination against HMG seems to me 
contradictory: and ± which is even more important ± the contradiction will be seen, 
DQGXVHGE\RWKHUV¶7KH6WUDVERXUJSURFHVVUXQVLQSDUallel with the reform program 
LQ 1RUWKHUQ ,UHODQG µDQG RQH FDQQRW KHOS EXW LQIOXHQFH WKH RWKHU¶ &RQWUDVWLQJ WKH
highly contentious allegations at Strasbourg with the need to reduce tensions in 
1RUWKHUQ ,UHODQG LW VXJJHVWV WKDW µ[the] incompatibility of the two processes is such 
that we should surely not allow this situation to develop¶ 7KH SROLWLFDO DQG OHJDO
spheres cannot be divorced; and the vital importance of political developments means 
that the legal process must in these circumstances be compromised. 
 
This rhetorical strategy, building on the idea of shared interests while denying the 
autonomy of the legal field, recurs in UK arguments in subsequent months and years. 
Thus, approaches in September 1973, with a view to initiating a friendly settlement, 
IRFXVVHGRQWKHVWDWHG,ULVKGHVLUHµto work for a peaceful and constructive solution in 
Northern Ireland¶DQG WKH ULVNRI µacrimonious exchanges¶ZKLFKFRXOGERWKXSVHW
the delicate state of affairs in Northern Ireland, and also make any subsequent 
settlement of the proceedings more difficult185. 
 
8. DUJXPHQWV DJDLQVW WKH ,ULVK GHFLVLRQ LQ 0DUFK  WR UHIHU WKH &RPPLVVLRQ¶V
report to the Court reflect a similar structure. The failure of the power-sharing 
initiative mentioned above and the bleaker political situation which followed meant 
there was less scope for focussing on common interests and initiatives, but the denial 
of an autonomous legal field remained central. The UK government, it argued, had 
QHYHUDFFHSWHGWKHYLHZµthat the state case could be kept separate from other aspects 
of Anglo/Irish relations¶WKHGHFLVLRQWRUHIHUWKHPDWWHUWRWKHFRXUWZRXOGLQHYLWDEO\
excite public and parliamentary opinion against the Dublin government and 
undermine Anglo-Irish cooperation, while at the same time strengthening the 
positions of extremists in both communities in Northern Ireland186. 
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The power of this argument lies in the way it de-legitimises the legal process by 
reference to an alternative, and implicitly superior, set of political values around 
cooperation, stability and development. By defining the legal process as a barrier to 
political progress, it allows extra-legal pressure to be brought to bear in response to 
the specifically legal arguments within the ECHR context. It ultimately found 
expreVVLRQZLWKLQWKH&RXUWLWVHOILQ$WWRUQH\*HQHUDO6DP6LONLQ¶VDUJXPHQWRSHQLQJ
WKH8.FDVHEHIRUHWKH&RXUWµ3URORQJHGLQWHUQDWLRQDO OLWLJDWLRQ¶ , he argued, µHYHQ
before this court, may impair rather than improve the protection of human rights, 
especially within a situation as complex, volatile and dangerous as that in Northern 
Ireland¶187. The legal process is instrumental; its ultimate end is the improvement of 
the human condition, and where it ceases to serve that end, it is subject to challenge 
on the basis of that underlying objective. 
 
This analysis of the relationship between the legal and political processes is not 
simply a rhetorical strategy; at least in the early stages of the case, it is reflected in 
internal UK memoranda questioning the tenability of the Irish approach, and the 
danger that it may have negative repercussions. As the case progressed, and did not 
seem to substantially impact either the security situation or the relationship between 
the governments, this judgement began to be questioned internally188. However, it 
remained a powerful rhetorical device which continued to be used in challenging the 
Irish approach. 
 
Thus, the 8.¶Vrhetorical position on the links between the legal and political fields 
was clear: the two were intrinsically linked, and any attempt to disaggregate them 
should be strongly resisted. The Irish position, by contrast, reflected the tensions and 
contradictions inherent in the reasons for bringing the case. As noted above, the 
Strasbourg case was initially brought following the failure of diplomatic initiatives to 
adequately resolve the issues of internment and mistreatment of prisoners. It 
represented, at least in part, a strategic shifting of these issues from the political to the 
legal field, in an effort to compel engagement and obtain a better overall outcome. 
However a rhetorical strategy of insulating the legal from the political began soon 
DIWHUFHUWDLQO\E\WKHWLPHRIWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VKHDULQJVRQDGPLVVLELOLW\LQ2FWREHU
1972, Irish diplomats were already expressing surprise at the overtly political way the 
FDVHZDVEHLQJFRQGXFWHGE\WKH8.DUJXLQJWKDWµthe Irish saw the case as a legal 
process to establish points of law and had no intention to attack HMG¶189. There was, 
on this analysis, no contradiction between conflict within the legal sphere and 
cooperation outside it. 
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The idea that the legal sphere is a distinct field, and that moves within it need not 
correspond with the wider political context recurs frequaently in Irish analyses of the 
case190. It is evident, for example, in submissions to the Commission in 1973 on the 
timing of the merits hearings. Responding to a UK proposal that hearings be delayed 
to avoid exacerbating tensions at a particularly delicate moment in Northern Ireland, 
the Dublin government emphasised WKDWµWKHREMHFWVIRUZKLFKLWVFODLP«KDVEHHQ
brought could best be served by an early hearing of the case¶191. They were forced to 
ZHLJK µthe advantages which would accrue to the people of Northern Ireland by a 
postponement and the disadvantages which might result from the consequent delay¶
While a large part of this Irish framing may have been addressed to domestic 
concerns, it also highlights the extent to which they sought to segregate the 
specifically legal aspects of the case, highlighting the distinct benefits which would 
flow from the legal process, and which could be jeopardised if it were subordinated to 
political considerations192. 
 
As between these contending accounts of the relationship between the legal and 
political fields, it was the Irish analysis which largely prevailed. While the UK 
FRQWLQXHG WR FKDOOHQJH WKH µVFKL]RSKUHQLD¶ RI WKH ,ULVK DSSURDFK WKH SHUFHLYHG
autonomy of the legal sphere meant that they were eventually constrained to accept it. 
From a relatively early stage, views were canvassed with the UK administration on 
potential ways of exerting political pressure on the Irish government to withdraw the 
case. Options considered ranged from threats to Irish interests in respect of Northern 
Ireland to retaliations in the wider Anglo-Irish relationship, including economic 
cooperation, nationality laws and EEC matters 193 . By bringing pressure to bear 
outside the mechanisms of the ECHR, power resources could be deployed which were 
unavailable within the legal field. As reflected in the quote opening this Part, if the 
Irish framing in terms of a distinct and autonomous legal field were accepted, the UK 
would be placed at an immediate disadvantage.194  Strength in the wider political 
setting must be brought to bear to compensate for relative weakness within the legal 
context. 
 
However, no such political retaliation was ever undertaken, reflecting the prevalence 
of an alternative view of how the case should be related to the wider political process. 
This latter view included a recognition that politicizing the Strasbourg case would 
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make it more difficult for the British government to achieve its diplomatic and 
political objectives; that progress in resolving the political situation must take 
precedence over challenging the Strasbourg process; and that to a great extent, the 
legal process could achieve, and indeed had achieved, autonomy from the political 
one195. While segregating the Strasbourg case limited the resources which the UK 
could bring to bear, it also limited the damage which the case could do196. If the UK 
was prepared to invest significant political capital in stopping the case, this might be 
possible; but if it were not, there was little option but to concede the Irish argument 
that Strasbourg was quite apart from the reVWRI1RUWKHUQ,UHODQG¶VSUREOHPVDQGWKDW
different rules did indeed apply. 
 
4.5 From International Law to Domestic Narrative 
 
The idea of a distinct legal field is also important in understanding the role of Irish 
domestic opinion in this case. Reference has already been made to the role of 
domestic pressure in initiating the case. Concern about the domestic audience, and 
about reactions among the minority community in Northern Ireland, remained a 
significant factor in Irish thinking at all stages197. However, to explain the case on this 
basis simply begs the question of why these groups viewed it as important, 
particularly once many of the issues it raised had begun to be addressed. Part of the 
answer lies in the straightforward need of the Irish government to be seen to be doing 
something in respect of Northern Ireland, particularly in periods when progress 
appeared slow198. However, the specific significance of the legal route still needs to 
be explained. 
 
In this respect, the idea of the case as a legal process, and the underlying idea of an 
autonomous legal field, is relevant to the domestic debate. While a key purpose of the 
Irish government in bringing the case was to put political pressure on the UK, it came 
to be seen in Irish public discourse as having a non-LQVWUXPHQWDO YDOXH LQ µSXWWLQJ
%ULWDLQRQWULDO¶199. Thus, for example, when the Irish government agreed for at least 
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partially strategic reasons to delay hearings on the merits, they were attacked for 
VHHPLQJWRµVHOORXW¶WKH1RUWKHUQPLQRULW\,n later thinking, a recurring concern was 
that any settlement would be seen as a betrayal of those on whose behalf the case was 
initially taken200. As the case came to be identified with questions of justice, rather 
than of politics, it became more difficult to leverage for political purposes. The same 
process of segregation of the legal and political spheres which was being actively 
SXUVXHG DW WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO OHYHO KDG WKH HIIHFW RI W\LQJ WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V KDQGV
domestically. While internationally the Irish argued that, as a legal process, the case 
was divorced from politics, within Irish public opinion it was its identification with 
the law, and the values which the law purports to embody, which made it so 
politically difficult. 
 
This point was recognised early in UK analyses, where discussions of settlement were 
conditioned on the need not only to convince the Irish government, but also to allow 
them to sell a settlement domestically201. Even if it was possible to engage the Dublin 
government in a communicative process, that government was also embedded in a 
parallel domestic discourse, and any settlement must be justifiable in domestic terms. 
There was less concern about British domestic opinion; the principal UK objective in 
WKLVUHVSHFWZDVWRSOD\GRZQWKHFDVH¶VRYHUDOOVLJQLILFDQFHDQGZKHUHQHFHVVDU\WR
ensure that the UK position was painted in the best possible light202. 
 
The Irish government, however, argued that the case could fulfil a valuable function 
in helping the British government to deal with its domestic constituents, and in 
particular the Unionist community in Northern Ireland. Thus, there are repeated 
references to the possibility that the case could allow the UK to go further on human 
rights reforms in Northern Ireland than might otherwise be possible203. By co-opting 
the legitimacy of the Commission behind reform proposals, these could more easily 
be sold to the recalcitrant Unionist community. However, a combination of a 
reluctance to move in response to Irish pressure, and scepticism about the political 
advisability of being seen to do so, meant that this argument was never tested in 
practice. 
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 See e.g. Letter Alexander to Armstrong (14 June 19733ULPH0LQLVWHU¶V2IILFH35(015/2141); 
Memorandum Secretary to Taoiseach (20 February 1976), Department of an Taoiseach, 
(NA2006/133/706). 
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 Letter Bone to Blatherwick (14 April 1972), Foreign and Commonwealth Office, (FCO87/138/86); 
Letter Peck to Crawford (26 June 1972), Foreign and Commonwealth Office, (FCO87/139/179) 
(DUJXLQJWKDWLWZDVQHFHVVDU\µERWKWRSHUVXDGH[Lynch] that it is in the Irish interest to drop the case 
DQGWRSURYLGHKLPZLWKSHUVXDVLYHDUJXPHQWVWRXVHDJDLQVWWKRVHZKRRSSRVHKLP¶). 
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 0HPRUDQGXPµ,PSOLFDWLRQVRIDQDGYHUVHGHFLVLRQLQWKH,ULVK6WDWH&DVH¶'RQQHOO\WR+DUGLQJ(26 
November 1974), Foreign and Commonwealth Office, (FCO87/404/321) 0HPRUDQGXP µ,ULVK 6WDWH
&DVH¶5HHVWR:LOVRQ(10 February 19763ULPH0LQLVWHU¶V2IILFH35(016/975). 
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5. Conclusion 
 
This paper began by sketching a model of international law as deliberative discourse, 
emphasising its communicative function, and the relations between legal and non-
legal argument, and between the international and domestic discourses in which 
agents are simultaneously embedded. It then examined two historical cases at the 
law/politics boundary to illustrate the relevance of this framework. At various points, 
I noted aspects of the case studies that seemed particularly relevant to this model. I 
here bring these together, to consider how far the model is in fact borne out in the 
cases. 
 
The aspect that is perhaps most clearly borne out is the mutual implication of legal 
and political argument. In neither case is law distinct from politics. Rather, it 
constitutes a mode of politics. In the UN case, we see this is in the invocation of legal 
arguments in the context of political lobbying, and in appeals to precedent to both 
inocculate and undermine politically difficult positions. In the ECHR case, we see 
argument in both legal and political modes; but we also, revealingly, see argument 
about the relation between these modes. The legal field is not only a locus of 
discourse: its existence is itself an object of discursive contestation. This reflects the 
second order nature of legal reasons, which may be pre-empted if the first-order 
reasons that support them do not in fact apply in a given case, particularly where that 
case can itself be constructed as exceptional. We thus see, in this contestation of the 
legal sphere, the extent to which international legal argument is simply a particular 
subset of, and constantly interacting with, international political argument; while at 
the same time recognising how understanding an issue in distinctively legal terms can 
lead political processes towards different conclusions. 
 
The relation between international and domestic discourses is also clear. We thus find, 
in the UN case, states constrained in the arguments they can make internationally by 
the need to maintain certain domestic shiboleths. In the ECHR case the process runs 
in two directions: initially, Irish domestic narratives shape the ECHR case; but that 
case in turn comes to be incorporated into those domestic narratives, a kind of 
discursive blow-back. Further, the relation between domestic and international is not 
simply restrictive. Rather, we see in both cases states translating their domestic 
concerns into the shared language of international law. Law thus makes possible 
reasoned exchanges that could not proceed in purely political and particularistic terms. 
 
The claim that legal argument plays a communicative role is less readily 
demonstrated. Certainly, we can identify behaviour on the part of states in both cases 
WKDW VHHPV PRWLYDWHG E\ WKH SRVVLELOLW\ RI FKDQJLQJ RWKHU VWDWHV¶ DWWLWXGHV WKURXJK
arguments. Implicit in that behaviour is the assumption that communicative action 
through the medium of law is at least possible at the international level. Legal 
argument, and legal process, are used not simply as threats or bargaining chips, but 
also as vehicles for promoting and challenging normative frames and assumptions. 
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Further, in the UN case we see various examples of third states reassessing their 
positions following argument, suggesting these states are engaging communicatively. 
This is less evident in the ECHR case, which may reflect the judicial structure of the 
(&+5¶VLQVWLWXWLRQVOHJDODUJXPHQWLVPRUHFOHDUO\DGGUHVVHGWRLPSDUWLDOGHFLVLRQ-
makers than political interlocutors. However, we do see very clearly in the ECHR 
case attempts, particularly by the UK, to engage the other government in a 
conversation about the ways shared goals and values might support particular actions. 
Further, we see on both sides a process of learning, and a reconstitution of positions, 
particularly in respect of the relation between the case and the political process. That 
relation is itself, as noted above, an object of discursive contestation, and it seems 
OLNHO\ WKLV SOD\V DW OHDVW VRPH UROH LQ WKH WZR VWDWHV¶ HYROYLQJ XQGHUVWDQGLQJV RI LW
There is nothing that can be unequivocally identified as communicative action, but 
there is much that is at least suggestive of its possibility. 
 
What does come out unequivocally from these cases is the inadequacy of international 
law frameworks, whether rationalist or constructivist, that seek to distinguish norm 
from agent, focussing on contestation around norms to the exclusion of contestation 
around agents. International political discourse, in which legal discourse is embedded, 
is in part an example of practical reasoning, hinging on the question of what I/you/we  
should do? Law, and social norms more generally, play an important role in 
answering that question, but they do so as part of a wider political process. In seeking 
the distinctive role of law, we must be careful not to lose sight of that embeddedness. 
 
